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PERSPECTIVES ON POLICY: THE EFFECTS OF U.S. GREATER MIDDLE EAST 
INITIATIVE ON EGYPTIAN POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
 
 
Maureen M. Mansour 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 This study examines the political attitudes of seven educated Egyptians from 
Alexandria, Egypt.  It seeks to understand their interpretations of the U.S. democratization 
policy in the Middle East, the Greater Middle East Initiative.  The goal is to understand if 
these Egyptians are receptive to the suggestion of democratic reforms and Egypt.  Personal 
interviews with open-ended questions allowed for individual insights and rich depth of 
information.   
 Interviews were conducted in Alexandria, Egypt as a traditionally liberal city with a 
long history of exposure to Western ideas.  The respondents are a part of a small elite sub-
group of Egyptian society.   As typically more liberal and open to Western ideas, educated 
members of Egyptian society have a distinct political culture and have been examined 
separately from the mass population.   
 Aside from one anti-Islamic respondent, the respondents express an overall negative 
view of the U.S. government, of which three cite positive feelings toward American people.  
Six of the seven respondents had very similar political attitudes including a belief that that 
the U.S. invaded Iraq as a quest for oil and to control of the Middle East, not for genuine 
democratic reforms.  Every participant expressed considerable pessimism about the 
prospects for democratization in the region.  The majority do not welcome America’s call for 
 iii
reform in Egypt because of mistrust of the U.S. or the belief that American values are ill-
suited for Egyptian society.  The results show that the personal narratives of these seven 
Egyptian individuals are very similar to the perspectives found in public opinion surveys 
previously conducted among the masses in Egypt.   
 Qualitative interviewing showed their strong belief that there is an all-powerful 
U.S.-Jewish conspiracy that enacts policies to target the Arab world.  This neo-colonial 
worldview interprets and perceives all negative political events as an example of the 
repeated injustices against Arabs and Muslims by Western powers.  
 
 
 1
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1   INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
 In response to global terrorism, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has shifted by 
emphasizing the concept of democratization and liberal political reform.  This policy, The Greater 
Middle East Initiative, is defined as a formal foreign policy doctrine for freedom in the Middle 
East.  The September 11th terrorist attacks on the U.S. acted as the catalyst for the change in 
policy as U.S. policymakers may the claim that democratization is a central part of the U.S. 
counterterrorism policy.  The Bush Administration has shifted U.S. policy of accepting the status 
quo of authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes to one that encourages democratic reforms. 
 The Greater Middle East Initiative aims to restructure the political, economic and 
strategic profile of the region from Pakistan to Morocco.1  On May 9, 2003, U.S. President 
George W. Bush formally proclaimed that it was time for the United States to support democracy 
in the Middle East:2   
We support the advance of freedom in the Middle East, because it is our founding 
principle, and because it is our national interest. The hateful ideology of terrorism is 
shaped and nurtured and protected by oppressive regimes. Free nations, in contrast, 
encourage creativity and tolerance and enterprise. And in those free nations, the appeal of 
1 “EU/Middle East: Solana’s Talks in Egypt Focus on Reform Initiative,” European Report (Europe 
Information Service, 6 March 2004): 506 [journal online] 
http://web6.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/383/661/48082959w6/purl=rc1_EAIM_0 (accessed 6 
April 2004). 
2 Glenn Frankel, “Egypt Muzzles Calls for Democracy,” Washington Post Foreign Service, 1 June 2004. 
http://coranet.radicalparty.org/pressreview/print_right.php?func=detail&par=7686 (accessed March 29, 
2004): p. 1 of 8. 
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extremism withers away.3 
 
The ultimate goal of this policy is to protect America’s national security interests claiming that by 
promoting political participation, it will serve as a complement to the war on terrorism.  By 
alleviating the political repression in the Middle East, the argument continues, Arab citizens will 
have an outlet for grievances, which will ultimately prevent the radicalization of Muslims. 
These alleged goals for democracy promotion are also clearly stated in the Bush administration’s 
2002 National Security Strategy of the United States and described as a core part of the overall 
U.S. national security doctrine: 
America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of 
law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal 
justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private 
property.4
 
Bush claims that during the past sixty years Western nations have excused the lack of freedom in 
the Middle East and has not made them safe because stability cannot be substituted for the 
expense of liberty.5  The objective is to combat the threat of terrorism by alleviating repressive 
conditions that contribute to the radicalization of Muslims.  By promoting democracy in the 
closed societies of the Middle East, the Bush administration seeks to promote a set of values that 
will be a powerful alternative to the appeal of religious extremism.  This will ultimately prevent 
its channel of expression, violent terrorist activity. 
 The U.S.-led war in Iraq in 2003 has been promoted by the Bush administration as a part 
of the U.S. effort to create a democratic world order.  U.S. leaders expected the mainstream Arab 
public to be impressed by the gratitude of the Iraqi people for their newfound freedom.  Anti-
3 Speech by President George W. Bush on 9 May 2003 at the University of South Carolina, (White House 
Government News Release), available from http//www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030509- 
11.html. 
4 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002) : 3. 
5 “Bush Says Democracy in MidEast Will be a Focus of U.S. Policy” (based on a speech by George W. 
Bush on 6 November 2003 at Whitehall Palace, London, England), in Official Texts of Greater Middle East 
Initiative (Cairo: Information Resource Center of American Embassy, 7 March 2004). 
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Americanism would then be discredited and new ways of thinking would emerge.6   The 
democratic transformation of Iraq was to be the model for the rest of the Middle East.   
 Public opinion in the Middle East about Iraq has generally scoffed at the Bush 
administration’s rhetoric of democracy promotion.  Language used by Arabs to describe the 
American presence in Iraq was not filled with gratitude; rather it paralleled descriptions of the 
hated Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza where American troops are called 
“invaders”, not liberators.7  The ambivalent U.S. attitudes toward Iraqi democracy have further 
reinforced deep preexisting skepticism about American intentions in the region. The aggressive 
U.S. policy of democratization through force has actually threatened the integrity of American 
political ideals.  It has further alienated the Arab world from the U.S. and the democratic ideals it 
seeks to promote.      
 Bush administration, however, misjudged the reaction of regarding the war in Iraq, and as 
a result, is having a difficult time being viewed as a champion of democracy. The overwhelming 
majority of Arabs in the Middle East claim that America’s decision to topple Saddam Hussein’s 
regime was driven by the desire to consolidate its regional and global hegemony, not for genuine 
democratic reform.  Additional survey research confirms these perceptions. 
 The American goal of spreading of democracy, often referred to as international 
liberalism, has been a component of liberal U.S. foreign policy throughout many previous U.S. 
administrations.  Promoting democratic values has been considered an integral part of the national 
interest of the country.  The theory is that of the U.S. supports freedom, individual rights, the rule 
of law, and democratic institutions around the world it will help secure peace and stability among 
states, and advance human rights within states.  The spread of liberal values to other countries is 
thought to secure the American way of life. 
6 Marc Lynch, “Taking Arabs Seriously,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 5 (2003) :  88, 81-94. 
7 Ibid., 89. 
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 This democratization policy rests on a set of assumptions about democratic nations.  
The rationale is that democratic institutions and processes will allow for a peaceful reconciliation 
of grievances and provide channels for participation in policymaking, thereby, addressing the 
underlining issues that fuel the rise of Islamist extremism.8  The claim is that a democratic 
government is subject to the will of the people and therefore less prone to war and less likely to 
breed or harbor terrorists.9  Similarly, tyrannical governments are expected to disregard 
international agreements and coerce their neighbors because they mistreat their own citizens.10  
The domestic affairs of a nation are assumed to be directly related to its foreign policy.   The U.S. 
democratization policy is based on the assumption that more democracies in the world will 
provide greater stability, less terrorism, and peaceful relations with other countries.11   
 The American definition of democracy includes various characteristics.  Democratization 
is seen as a process that promotes democratic practices including the right of adult citizens to 
choose their leader through free and fair elections.  Citizens should have the opportunity to 
participate in making decisions that affect their lives and have the right to criticize their 
government for its actions.  Leaders should be accountable and responsive to the needs of their 
citizens because of the transparency of political decision-making.  A national economy that 
fosters competitions and free enterprise is also considered vital for a viable democracy.  The 
Greater Middle East Initiative sets three reform priorities to achieve these goals: promoting 
democracy and good governance, building a knowledge society, and expanding economic 
opportunities.12  
8 Jennifer L. Windsor, “Promoting Democratization Can Combat Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly 
26.3 (2003) : 43,  43-58. 
9 Suzanne Nossel, “Smart Power,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (2004) : 135, 131-142. 
10 Robert Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine,” American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays 5d ed., 
ed. John G. Ikenberry (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005) : 577, 576-599. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, “The Greater Middle East Initiative: Off to a False Start,” Policy 
Brief 29 (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2004). 
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 The U.S. is particularly interested in Egypt as one of its most important allies in the 
Middle East. Egypt has considerable moral influence on other Arab states as well as a central 
geographic location that contributes greatly to its strategic importance.13  Throughout history 
cumulative research on this “political trendsetter” has introduced methods and concepts in study 
of Arab political systems more generally and has provided a barometer of “changing trends and 
generational shifts in approaches to understanding Middle Eastern politics.”14  Egypt’s future 
political course has and will continue to have an immense affect on the rest of the Middle East.   
 In relation to U.S. interests, few other countries in the Middle East are considered as vital 
as Egypt.  It is considered the “gate to the Arab world and the anchor of American Middle East 
policy,”15 because of its proximity to the oil-producing Gulf region and active involvement in the 
Arab Israeli peace process.  The U.S. made Egypt an important ally in the region when it became 
the first Arab country to make peace with Israel.  As Egypt continues to be a pivotal actor in 
diplomatic efforts in the region, it remains the second biggest recipient of U.S. military and 
economic aid16 receiving over two billion dollars each year.17    
 The importance of Egypt to U.S. policy is emphasized once again in relation to the new 
effort to promote democracy in the Middle East.  U.S. President George W. Bush encourages 
democratic reform in Egypt by saying, “The great and proud nation of Egypt has shown the way 
toward peace in the Middle East, and now should show the way toward democracy in the Middle 
13 Joseph P. Lorenz, Egypt and the Arabs: Foreign Policy and the Search for National Identity (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1990), xiii. 
14 Pamela Day Pelletreau and Robert Springborg, “Egypt,” Handbook of Political Science Research on the 
Middle East and North Africa, ed. Bernard Reich (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), 23-43. 
15 Fawaz A. Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 171. 
16 Frankel, “Egypt Muzzles Calls, 2. 
17 Gerges, 171. 
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East.”18 The hope is that the Egyptian regime, led by President Hosni Mubarak, will start 
implementing meaningful political reforms and causing other Arab regimes to follow its lead. 
 A transition to a viable democracy in Egypt will be significantly affected by a very 
important aspect of the political process, the political culture of society.  Political culture refers to 
the beliefs, values, and feelings that influence political behavior19 and give meaning to the 
political process.  It is an essential variable that will help determine the functioning of a political 
system of a nation-state.  Without citizens’ support for a democratic political process, it will be 
very difficult for Egypt to make a successful transition to a stable democracy.   
 The Egyptian citizens themselves must see the need for reforms and support the 
necessary changes to do so.  Therefore, it is vital for to emphasize the importance of Egyptian 
political culture and make every effort to understand its political history and perceptions before a 
democratization policy can be implemented.  It is vital to understand political attitudes of 
Egyptians regarding democratization in order to assess the prospects of a viable democracy and 
how best to promote it.  Increasingly, survey research has provided insight regarding political 
attitudes among the mass population in Egypt and the rest of the Middle East as well.  Public 
opinion surveys are useful in aggregating perceptions of the masses in society and providing an 
overall view of public opinion. 
 The concept of political culture rests on the idea that each individual incorporates their 
own historical context and personality, knowledge, and feelings about politics.20  It is a subjective 
notion that gives meaning to the polity and is made up of both a “collective history of a political 
system and the life histories of the individuals who currently make up the system.”21  Therefore, it 
18 George W. Bush speech, 6 November 2003 in Washington D.C. 
19 Gabriel A. Almond ed., “The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept,” in The Civic Culture 
Revisited, ed. Sidney Verba (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), 29. 
20 Lucian W. Pye, ed., “Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development,” in Political Culture and 
Political Development, ed. Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 7. 
21 Ibid., 8. 
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is rooted in both public events and private experiences equally.  This study examines these private 
experiences in order to complement the earlier findings of political culture in Egypt found in 
survey research.   
 There is specific sub-group of society that should be given special emphasis for the study 
of political culture and democratization.  The educated members of society have a special role to 
play in the mobilization of the masses and the push toward reform.  Typically those who have 
been in a university setting have been exposed to a wide array of ideas and engaged in critical 
thinking.  This experience with education often makes an individual more receptive to new ways 
of thinking and approaches to life.  They are more likely to be open to Western ideas of rational 
thought, equality, and liberty, which are fundamental for the emergence of a democratic system. 
 In Egyptian society, those who obtain a university degree are considered among the elite 
in terms of social status.  In 1998-99, only 1.28 million full-time and 250,000 part-time students 
were enrolled out of a population of approximately 52.5 million. This means that only a small 
percentage (roughly 2.5 percent) of Egyptians are students that graduate with opportunities to 
become doctors, lawyers, journalists and entrepreneurs.  According to 2005 statistics, only 59.3 
percent of the adult population in Egypt is literate (69.4 percent of males and 48.9 percent of 
females).22  There is a growing disparity between the citizens with access to higher education and 
those who are more concerned with survival. 
 While a university education allows individuals more opportunities than those without, 
widespread nepotism and corruption in government practices often restricts opportunities 
available to them.  In a free and fair democratic society, the educated stand to gain the most in a 
‘survival of the fittest’ system that rewards those who have the knowledge and capabilities to 
progress.  They would greatly benefit from having their voices heard by a more democratic 
22 “Egypt,” Encarta Online Encyclopedia, [database on-line]; available from 
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761557408_2/Egypt.html#endads. 
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government.  They may even take the opportunity to become active in the government and may 
even consider running for office in an election.  It is logical to assume then that it is more likely 
that educated Egyptians would have a positive view towards the idea of democratization than 
others in society.  They would benefit from a political system that promotes free market 
capitalism and participation in the political process.  Are these educated elites looking forward to 
America’s push for democracy in Egypt? Do they see it as an opportunity to move forward and 
finally have a say in the political process?  The present study will answer these questions by 
taking a comprehensive look at the political attitudes of these educated individuals. 
 The individuals selected for the study are from a city that has historically been more 
exposed to Western thought than any other in Egypt.  Since its establishment by Alexander the 
Great, the city of Alexandria has a rich history full of foreign influence.  As the main port of the 
country, Alexandria is located on the Mediterranean Sea amidst the only trade route to Asia and 
Africa for hundreds of years.  Fareed Zakaria calls Alexandria, “a cosmopolitan city that was 
more Mediterranean than Arab.”23  It has long been the intellectual center of Egypt known for its 
scholars and famous libraries full of scholarly works.  Citizens of Alexandria often spoke four of 
five languages including French, English, German, and Spanish.  With a long history of Western 
thought, these citizens are more likely to be open to Western ideas than others throughout Egypt. 
 To fully grasp the political attitudes of educated individuals in Alexandria, an interview 
approach is most valuable.  It provides each respondent with the freedom to respond to open-
ended questions in order to better understand the interpretative style of each subject.  The purpose 
is to understand a person’s mind that cannot be directly observed or quantified.  Open-ended 
interviews allow those being interviewed to express their perspective without influencing them 
23 Fareed Zakaria, “Islam, Democracy, and Constitutional Liberalism,” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 
1, (Academy of Political Science, 2004): 5, 1-20. 
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with preconceived categories.  Entering into another person’s perspective is the goal of an 
interview.  The assumption is that their perspective is meaningful and able to be made explicit.24
 The study provides a systematic analysis of the perceptions of seven Egyptian 
respondents who have been educated and reside in Alexandria.  The relatively small number of 
respondents allows for an in-depth analysis of the personal narrative of each individual.  This 
approach is valuable for understanding the personal narratives of each individual.  Marc Howard 
Ross provides three concrete reasons for the importance of personal narratives.  The first is that 
their metaphors and images allow social scientists to understand how these individuals 
“understand the social and political worlds in which they live.”25  Personal narratives also reveal 
“deep fears, perceived threats, and past grievances that drive a conflict.”26  Lastly, these 
narratives are vital in identifying particular actions and responses given for the explanations of 
certain events.27   
 The qualitative interview approach is crucial for the study of perception and cultural 
interpretations that affect political attitudes.  It allows for a comprehensive insight that is essential 
to providing a complete picture of the social science phenomena that is being studied.  While 
quantitative research conducted through mass surveys and opinion polls often provides valuable 
information about the general population, it neglects to explore the rich, detailed experience of an 
individual’s perception.  Indeed, the factual information collected from polls can be quantified 
neatly into neat numbers and provide precise conclusions.  However, the concept of personal 
perception is not necessarily precise or neatly quantifiable. Quantifying perceptions may be 
precise in its methodology, while in terms of applicability, conclusively inaccurate. 
24 Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Evaluation Methods, (Beverly Hills, CA: 1980), 196. 
25 Marc Howard Ross, “The Political Psychology of Competing Narratives: September 11 and Beyond,” in 
Understanding September 11, eds. Craig Calhoun, Paul Price, and Ashley Timmer (NY: New Press, 2002), 
303.   
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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 The important questions explored throughout each interview involves each respondent’s 
definition of democracy, involvement with political parties, view about motivations of U.S. 
democratization in Iraq, attitude towards the U.S. and whether and to what extent they welcome 
American democratic ideals in their country.  How does each respondent make sense, interpret, or 
make meaning of U.S. democratization policy in the Middle East?  How does each respondent 
describe his or her feelings, opinions, or cultural beliefs?  The goal is to understand how the 
respondents view the subject, to learn about their terminology and judgments, and to capture the 
complexities of their individual perceptions and experiences.28  The meanings given to specific 
concepts and events including issues concerning democracy, political parties, and U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq will be studied.  
 Based on the political history of Egyptians and various scholarly works, the hypothesis is 
that the perceptions of the educated respondents will be similar to those found in public opinion 
surveys.  They mostly have similar negative opinions toward U.S. democratization policy in the 
Middle East.  The basic assumptions of the hypothesis include: respondents will most likely have 
a deep mistrust of the U.S. because of its foreign policies, rather than for American values; the 
respondents will mostly likely name alternative explanations for U.S. intentions in Iraq such as a 
quest for Middle East oil, global hegemony, or to engage in a war on Islam (much like during the 
time of the Crusades); the respondents will not believe that democracy promotion as truly the 
reason for the U.S. removal of Saddam Hussein, and will be highly mistrustful of the entire 
concept of democratization in the Middle East.  The respondents will show deep mistrust of U.S. 
policies in the region, similar to those previously cited in public opinion surveys in the Middle 
East.  They will mistrust U.S. intentions in Iraq and the implementation of The Greater Middle 
East Initiative interpreting it as a means to increase American control of the region.    
28 Patton, 197. 
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 Many discussions about democracy in the Middle East are based on anecdotal 
experiences and theological beliefs.  There is actually very little field research that has been done 
in the region concerning public opinion and democratic reforms.  Some claim to understand Arab 
and Muslim peoples without first-hand knowledge of the region and its culture.  This study will 
go beyond anecdotal evidence and explore the personal narratives of citizens who live in the 
region and are a part of the political culture. 
 
Methodology 
  Field research of a political nature is rarely conducted in Egypt because of tight 
government restrictions.  The Egyptian government sees the discussion of democratization as a 
politically sensitive issue that increases the chances that participants will more openly express 
any dissatisfaction they may have with the regime.  Since the researcher has Egyptian citizenship 
and does not need a visa to enter the country or stay for extended periods of time, governmental 
approval is not required for the research.  In addition, all interviews were conducted in Egyptian 
Colloquial Arabic as the spoken language and dialect of the country.  The fact that the interviewer 
speaks the language with the appropriate dialect helped build rapport with each respondent and 
increases the likelihood that the respondents were in fact honest.  
 The repressive political environment in Egypt means that the interviewer has an ethical 
obligation to ensure that the participants would not be harmed as a result of the study.  It is the 
researcher’s responsibility to ensure that each respondent will not be harmed emotionally, 
physically, or financially.29  To protect the participants from governmental measures including 
possible arrest and detainment, the name of each participant is disguised and their identity hidden.  
Each respondent was verbally assured by the interviewer that their identity would not be 
29 Herbert J. Rubin and Irene S. Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data (London: Sage 
Publications, 1995), 94. 
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uncovered in any written and verbal accounts of the research.  The promise of confidentiality was 
an effort to alleviate any possible fears of imprisonment by the Egyptian government allowing 
more honest answers.  This is especially true if a respondent in the event that a respondent was 
particularly concerned about their government’s repressive measures against freedom of speech.   
 The possibility of oppressive government measures did not allow the interviewer to tape 
record the interviews. The possibility that the tape could be confiscated by the Egyptian 
authorities would make the respondents highly uncomfortable and would most likely influence 
their answers.  Transcription of the answers allowed the respondents to answer the questions 
more candidly without the uneasiness that would accompany tape recording.  Handwritten notes 
were taken by the interviewer in order to help make the respondents feel more at ease to answer 
questions concerning sensitive issues such as democratization.  The open-ended nature of the 
questions required approximately two hours of transcription for each half hour interview. 
 The fact that the interviewer had to both ask questions and transcribe the answers was not 
without its costs.  It made it more difficult to observe non-verbal cues and physical gestures, 
which can be helpful in capturing each nuanced response.   Multitasking also made it more 
difficult to ascertain is a respondent was not being honest or discreetly lying.  The very nature of 
handwriting increased the chances that the answers were recorded less accurately.  The fact that 
each response was written by hand makes it more difficult for the interviewer to record every 
possible gasp, sigh, and hesitation.   
 Without a tape of the interviews, it was not possible for the interviewer (or additional 
researchers) to listen to each interview repeatedly.  The benefit of multiple interpretations of the 
raw data was not possible.  As the sole recorder of the data, the interviewer had to be even more 
aware of the importance of non-bias.  The objectivity of the interviewer is even more important 
given the inability for other interpretations of the raw data collected.  The interviewer maintained 
their objectivity without seeming completely disassociated with the respondent.  An interviewer 
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who is too formal or objective would be sacrificing sensitivity necessary to maintain the desired 
informal conversational partnership.  Objectivity was maintained as all questions were asked in 
the same tone without non-verbal cues from the interviewer, such as nodding of the head that may 
lead respondents or influence their answers.   
 While these drawbacks of transcription were unfortunate, they were also unavoidable.  
Tape recording would have resulted in greater negative consequences in terms of reliability.  
Other than making it almost impossible to find participants willing to be recorded, those who 
would have agreed would not have been truthful for fear of punishment by the government.  
Answers especially related to the political situation in Egypt would have been restricted and 
limited to a more positive description for fear of repercussions by the government.  Tape 
recording compromises the honesty of each respondent and the rapport with the interviewer with 
whom they already regard with suspicion.  These costs are much more detrimental to the study 
than missing non-verbal cues associated with transcription. 
 Even with the precautions of handwritten notes, there is still a possibility that the 
respondents were not honest in expressing their true opinions and feelings.  Although the 
interviewer is of Egyptian heritage and speaks the language, they are naturally suspicious of 
foreigners who live in the U.S. (even Egyptian-Americans).  It is possible that a few respondents 
were fearful that the interviewer was a spy for the U.S. government.  For example, respondents 
may have falsely described the political system in Egypt as a democratic system in the hopes that 
it will be relayed to U.S. government authorities. 
 The interview method is a combination of an in-depth qualitative and standardized 
approach.  The interviews were standard because the same questions are asked in the same order.  
This maintains consistency of the subject matter and increase the reliability of the data.  
Respondents were asked a standardized set of questions in order to maintain focus and a common 
theme among all the interviews.  Given the flexible nature of qualitative research however, open-
 14
                                                          
ended questions follow the standard questions.  The exploratory approach gives each respondent 
the ability to express their own interpretation of events and issues without being constrained by 
the interviewer’s questions.   It allowed the interviewer to deviate from the script to probe for 
more detail if necessary.  The respondents were not pressured to answer in brief concise terms.   
This captures the individual’s feelings more completely than very rigid standardized interview 
approaches.   
 The qualitative approach allows for a flexible and exploratory interview in which 
respondents are asked open-ended questions designed to allow them to express personal 
experiences and detailed stories.  Questions asked such as “why?” or “why not?”, for example, 
are truly open-ended and allowed each respondent to choose from a range of possible responses.  
This shows what themes, examples, and words the subject associates with question in order to 
describe their feelings and thoughts.30  This interview style matches the goal of the interviews, 
which is not to identify an objective truth, but to understand the perception and conclusions 
drawn regarding U.S. foreign policy.  Each respondent’s unique interpretation will be encouraged 
through the flexibility of this qualitative approach.  The respondents will have the opportunity to 
elaborate on their opinions and feelings in order to help the researcher understand the 
explanations of their thoughts and behaviors.31  
 The interviewer had to balance the exploratory nature of qualitative interviewing with 
another ethical consideration during the interviews.  The issue concerns pressing a respondent for 
information without making them feel threatened.32  Again, the environment in Egypt plays a role 
in the increased level of suspicion felt by the respondents especially when being asked questions 
pertaining to democratization.  When faced with the decision of whether to probe further, the 
30 Patton, 212. 
31 James K. Doyle, “Introductions to Interviewing Techniques,” in Handbook for IQP Advisors and 
Students [database on-line] (Worcester, MA: Worcester Polytechnic Institute, 2004) available from 
http://www.wpi.edu/Academics/Depts/IGSD/IQPHbook/ch11.html (accessed 23 July 2005). 
32 Rubin and Rubin, 97. 
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interviewer did not want to risk the rapport with the respondent and therefore chose not to probe 
further.  Pushing too hard for explanations would run the risk that the respondent will lie or 
distort their answers even shut down completely.33  The interviewer probed very carefully and 
selectively in order to maintain a comfortable atmosphere that was necessary for rest of the 
interview.  Not fully covering each issue raised by each respondent may have slightly 
compromised the validity of the data collected. 
 One drawback of in-depth qualitative interviewing is that fact that it is time consuming 
and requires a great deal of effort on the part of the interviewer.   This made it difficult to conduct 
comprehensive interviews with a many more participants as a larger sample of those educated in 
Alexandria.  The seven respondents interviewed in this study represent a relatively small sample 
of all of those educated in Alexandria.  While their perspectives alone cannot be generalized to 
the entire Egyptian population, they will be compared with those of found in mass public opinion 
surveys as a more complete approach. 
 The researcher adhered to various ethical obligations while conducting the research.  All 
deception was avoided with the parameters of the research outlined before each interview.  Every 
respondent was verbally informed of the nature of the research and the purpose of the study.  The 
research was explained as an attempt to understand perceptions of democratization and U.S. 
foreign policy.  The respondents were also informed about how the data were to be used.  They 
understood that the results would be used as academic scholarly work and that their participation 
was completely voluntary.  The respondents were not asked to sign an informed consent form to 
verify their willingness to participate.  A signed written agreement would have violated the 
anonymity of each respondent and broken the vital trust between the researcher and the 
respondent, ultimately disrupting the research.   
33 Ibid., 98. 
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 There were only two criteria for the selection of respondents, education and residence.  
Each respondent must have obtained a University degree and be a native of Alexandria.   The 
politically sensitive environment made the process of selecting the respondents is a very delicate 
one, since the majority of Egyptians are highly reluctant to speak about issues such as democracy 
and U.S. policies with a stranger.  Getting past these barriers requires a trusted mediator to vouch 
for the identity and trustworthiness of the interviewer.  The interviewer contacted various 
personal contacts in Egypt to assist in the random selection of other participants.  Each contact 
was told the same exact information regarding the purpose of the interview.  They were also told 
to randomly choose a willing participant based only on their education and residence.  The use of 
a mediator to select respondents was essential in making contacts with the respondents.  Without 
this critical link, the interviews would not have been possible.  
 There are drawbacks to this method of participant selection.  The first involves the idea 
that each personal contact asked to select the respondents is associated with the interviewer.  This 
leaves the possibility that each respondents is chosen from essentially the same pool of people.  
To lessen the likelihood of this occurring, the interviewer made a conscience attempt to contact 
seven different contacts who did not know one another.  Another possibility is that these personal 
contacts chose people whom they thought would be appropriate, rather than completely at 
random.  The bias of this mutual contact may have affected the selection of the respondents.  
They may have chosen respondents who are more outspoken or politically knowledgeable, for 
example, which may have in turn, affected the validity of the data. 
 The selection process resulted in seven willing participants; two from the Coptic 
Orthodox Christian minority and five were from the Sunni Muslim majority.   This is appropriate 
given the Muslim majority in Egypt.   The gender breakdown was slightly less balanced.  Women 
were underrepresented in the study with only one Coptic woman interviewed.  The perspective of 
at least one other woman would have contributed to the study by allowing for a valuable 
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comparison between answers of men and women.  A perspective of a Muslim woman, therefore, 
is not addressed in this particular study. 
 In addition, the timing of the interviews may have affected the respondents’ answers.  
They took place in the summer months between June and May 2004, two years after the invasion 
of Iraq by a U.S.-led coalition and the subsequent overthrow of Saddam Hussein.  Larry 
Diamond, who served as a Senior Advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, 
described the situation in Iraq as, “endemic violence, a shattered state, a nonfunctioning 
economy, and a decimated society.”34  Part of the predicament was that Iraqis, although grateful 
for the overthrow of their dictator, were suspicious of U.S. motives in their country.  Many Iraqis 
viewed the invasion not as liberation, but as an occupation by Western powers.  This view 
coupled with the U.S. policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict caused the occupation authority to lack a 
considerable amount of legitimacy35 in the eyes of many Iraqis as well as other Middle 
Easterners.   
 Like many other media outlets around the world, the Arab media shows increasing 
violence and disorder in Iraq created by an opposing insurgency.  Images of the horrors of war are 
continuously shown throughout Egypt and the Middle East.  Media outlets such as the Qatar-
based news channel, Al-Jazeera, often show images of injured Iraqi women and children as well 
as destroyed homes as a result of the war.  Respondents who may have been recently exposed to 
these images may have a more negative perception of U.S. democratization policy.  The effects of 
media exposure on perceptions may be short-term and not necessarily reflect long-term deeply 
held beliefs.  To adequately examine this point, perceptions must be studied over time to account 
for surrounding events that may have temporarily influenced their political attitude.  It was not 
34 Larry Diamond, “What Went Wrong In Iraq,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 5, (2004): 34, 34-56. 
35 Ibid., 43-44. 
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possible to interview each respondent more than once to explore whether their perceptions were 
maintained over time. 
 A respondent’s interpretation of a question or specific word within the question may have 
also been a determining factor.  For example, the term “democratization” may denote a negative 
connotation for a respondent who may consider the concept as foreign or an idea imposed from 
the outside.  In addition, one question asks the respondents why they think the U.S. has enacted a 
democratization policy.  This may have led them to consider alternative reasons (other than 
democracy promotion) that they may not have thought of otherwise. 
 
Documented Survey Analysis 
 
 The interview questions were similar to questions asked in a mass survey conducted a 
year earlier.  This allows for a valuable comparison of data with many benefits.  The combination 
of results from two kinds of inquiry provides more complete picture of Egyptian political 
attitudes.  Interview results of the political attitudes of the educated elite in Alexandria will be 
compared to those of the masses surveyed in Cairo.  How do the educated respondents compare 
with the opinion of the masses?  How are they similar or different?  Similar attitudes suggest that 
there is continuity among the educated elite and the masses on issues concerning U.S. 
democratization policy.  The benefit of incorporating the quantitative results of the survey with 
the interview findings also allows for greater applicability to the general population and an 
increased ability to generalize the findings from the interviews. 
 Another extremely beneficial outcome of combining the qualitative findings is the ability 
to facilitate the interpretations of a quantitative approach.  While the mass survey established that 
a majority have negative public opinions of the U.S. and its policies, it does not provide 
comprehensive reasons that account for this sentiment.  The qualitative study helps to explain the 
underlying factors behind this broad relationship.  The complex nature of a person’s perception 
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requires a more in-depth approach than quantitative survey research.  Comprehensive interviews 
will more adequately explore the reasons behind the respondents’ answers as well as non-verbal 
elements of behavior, which is naturally overlooked in quantitative analysis.  Survey findings are 
supplements with comprehensive personal narratives that provide a deeper look as to why and 
how these perspectives may have been formed. The interview process allows for a nuanced and 
intricate understanding of the perception of each respondent.  The respondents have an 
opportunity to answer the same questions asked in the survey, only this time, with the added 
value of using their own words.  The benefit giving them a choice of words and explanations is 
having complete understanding of their perspective without limits that naturally accompany 
close-ended questions.   
 The results of the survey conducted by Professor Shibley Telhami from the University of 
Maryland for the Zogby International organization and will be the basis for a valuable 
comparison. From February 19 to March 11, 2003, the survey was distributed among the mass 
population in the Middle East.36  The questions focused on perceptions of the U.S. and its policies 
abroad and were conducted in six Arab countries, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Lebanon, surveying a total of 3,020 men and women.37  The results 
show similar that public opinion was similar in all of the countries surveyed. 
 The total sample size in Egypt is 700 and consists of respondents who filled out 
questionnaires in Cairo, the capital city.38  All respondents were above 18 years of age with the 
gender composition based on that of the Egyptian population.  The sample was selected based on 
a Systematic Random Sampling Scheme because of the lack of a population census.  The 
36 Shibley Telhami, “A View From the Arab World: A Survey in Five Countries” (Washington D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution and Saban Center for Middle East Policy, 13 March 2003) available from 
http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/survey20030313.pdf. 
37 Youseff M. Ibrahim, “A Post-war Arab World- Three Views - Democracy Be Careful What You Wish 
For,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 22, no. 4, (2003), 14. 
38 Telhami, “View From the Arab World,” 2003. 
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stratified random sample selection ensured that the probability will be proportional to the size 
(PPS) of the population in the selection of both males and females and Muslim and Coptic 
Christians.  Of the three strata of economic social classes surveyed, there were 274 in the low 
social class, 147 in the middle class and 279 in the high class.  Of that sample 20 were Coptic 
Christian in the low social class, 6 in the middle and 17 in the high class.  The margin of error is 
+/- 3.8 percent.39  The selection of respondents from various categories including economic class, 
religious affiliation, and gender, ensures that a wide array of people is represented.  This allows 
for the results of the survey to be applied to the larger population.  
 The results show that anti-Americanism is at an all-time high with both the U.S. and its 
policies are viewed favorably.  Less than 6 percent of the respondents believed that the United 
States was waging a campaign in Iraq to create a more democratic Arab world.  Close to 95 
percent were convinced that the motivation was control of Arab oil and the subjugation of the 
Palestinians to Israel’s will.  A major source of negative attitudes is resentment of U.S. policy 
toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and deep mistrust of American intentions in Iraq.”40
 The mistrust of American intentions in Iraq is also accompanied by pessimism about the 
outcome of the war.  Asked if the result of the war would bring more or less democracy, only 2 
percent of Moroccans, 3 percent of Saudis, and 6 percent of Egyptians believed that the Middle 
East would be more democratic after the war.41  These views surely provide evidence that the 
U.S. public diplomacy campaign has not succeeded in changing the negative views of the U.S. in 
the region.42   
 The findings of this survey in Egypt show that that Egyptian public opinion towards the 
U.S. is highly unfavorable with only 13 percent who expressed a favorable opinion compared to 
39 Ibid. 
40 Shibley Telhami, “Arab Public Opinion on the United States and Iraq: Prospects for Changing Prewar 
Views,” Brooking Review 21, no.3, (2003): 24. 
41 Ibid., 27. 
42 Ibid. 
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79 percent who expressed an unfavorable view.  When asked whether this opinion is based on 
U.S. foreign policy or their own values, the results were more evenly divided with 43 percent 
basing it on their values and 46 percent on U.S. policy.43  This shows a clear indication that the 
majority of Egyptians surveyed have a negative view of the U.S. What is less clear, however, is 
what the majority of Egyptians base their opinion on; their own values or U.S. policies. 
 Other questions asked in this survey concentrated on the issue of the U.S.-led war in Iraq.  
The findings show that 63 percent of Egyptians felt that the war with Iraq would bring less 
democracy and three-fourths (79 percent) say the war will bring less peace to the Middle East.  In 
addition, 74 percent of the Egyptians surveyed believed that the war would cause more terrorism 
toward the U.S.44  These findings show that the majority of Egyptians surveyed are pessimistic 
about the prospect of democracy and peace in the Middle East after the U.S.-led war in Iraq. 
 One drawback from Telhami’s mass survey is indicative of the nature of close-ended 
questions.  The kinds of questions chosen for the study provide preconceived categories to which 
each respondent must conform.  They must also choose from the answers provided in the study, 
which may also lead them to consider options they may not have otherwise.  When asked about 
the U.S.-led war in Iraq, for example, the option of “less democracy” may cause a respondent to 
consider that as a possible outcome of the war and may have influenced their answer.  Also, the 
respondent does not have the ability to show to what extent they agree with the statement.  As 
with all social science research, it is always a possibility that a respondent will not answer 
truthfully.  The promise of confidentiality, however, most likely alleviates most fears associated 
with a repressive political environment. 
 Exploring the perceptions of educated individuals allows for a valuable comparison with 
data from this mass public opinion survey.  The combination of both qualitative and quantitative 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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analysis gives a holistic understanding of Egyptian public opinion, including both the masses and 
the educated elite.  The research will provide valuable insights essential for those seeking to 
capture the hearts and minds of the peoples of the Middle East and reverse the rise of anti-
American sentiment. 
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CHAPTER 2   LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
The Importance of Political Culture 
 
 There have been various theoretical and empirical studies conducted on the significance 
of political culture and public opinion.  In The Civic Culture (1963), Gabriel Almond and Sidney 
Verba were among the first to empirically study the affects of attitudes and beliefs of citizens on 
the viability of democratic institutions.  They theorized that peoples’ belief in three main areas 
comprise their civic culture; the ability to influence political decisions, feelings of positive affect 
of the political system, and belief that other citizens are basically trustworthy.  They took a 
psychological and individualistic approach through survey research methods in a cross-national 
context by examining the U.S., Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Mexico.45  The Civic Culture 
described the term “parochial” as an individual who is more involved in his family or community 
and expects very little from government.46  Satisfaction would be a result of personal efforts or 
because of another institution such as the family.    
 Almond and Verba found that countries with a high level of these civic culture attitudes 
are more likely to adopt and sustain democracy over time than countries with low levels 
regardless of socioeconomic factors.  They concluded that, “Unless the political culture is able to 
support a democratic system, the chances for the success of that system is slim.”47  These findings 
have significantly contributed to the study of political culture by emphasizing the importance of a 
society’s normative evaluations of a political system.   
45 Gabriel. A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in 
Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 46. 
46 Ibid., 17. 
47 Ibid. 
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 Almond and Verba’s work has a few shortcomings, however, due to its limited focus of 
traditional questions regarding democratic theory that reflect their bias in favor of stable 
democracies.  Their view of political culture is quite simplistic by suggesting that a society is 
either conducive to democracy or not.  They lack a nuanced approach that takes into account 
varying stages of political culture throughout the democratization process.  To explain the 
complex nature of political culture they use overly simplistic categories including terms such as 
parochial, subject or participant.48  This fails to take into account the possibility of distinct 
variations of political culture due to various sub-groups within society.  
 Later works such as Political Culture and Political Development (1965) provided a more 
nuanced approach to the study of political culture.  Pye and Verba sought to go beyond the study 
of formal structures and institutions of politics and focus on the “beliefs that affect the ways in 
which people act with these political institutions.”49  Political beliefs both affect and are affected 
by the manner in which political structures operate.  A nation’s political culture is affected by the 
experiences that individuals have with the political process.  This leads to the study of the 
learning experiences that allow political culture to be passed down from one generation to the 
next.  This includes a nation’s political history and how political beliefs are affected by the 
memories of political events.50
 Sidney Verba explains how political events are perceived and interpreted by people who 
have previously held beliefs.51  Political history is described as a series of events interpreted 
differently by different people depending on their beliefs.  Political beliefs are based on general 
values, norms, emotional attachments which affect the manner in which individuals become 
involved in a political system.  Both meaning and interpretation are critical to how a person 
48 Ibid. 17-19. 
49 Sidney Verba ed., “Comparative Political Culture,” in Political Culture and Political Development, ed. 
Lucian W. Pye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 514. 
50 Ibid., 515. 
51 Ibid. 
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perceives external political events. Political culture is a part of the larger culture of a society and 
includes general values not related to political life.52  
 Verba also introduces dimensions of how to analyze political culture on a national level.  
The first concerns the first and most basic issue, national identity, which is the extent to which an 
individual considers them self a member of a nation-state.  If this sense of identity is strong, it 
legitimizes the activities of national leaders and makes it possible for them to mobilize the 
support of its followers.  The second dimension is an individual’s identification with fellow 
citizens, which is the sense of integration that a person has with others in the political system.  A 
country in which individuals have confidence in other citizens as political actors is a critical 
aspect of a democratic political culture.  Another dimension concerns beliefs about governmental 
output.  This concerns a citizen’s expectation of what the government ought to do for them.  
These expectations can range from absolutely no governmental expectations to the strong 
desirability of governmental activity.  The last dimension concerns the process of making 
decisions.  This is the beliefs about the way in which the government makes decisions.  In some 
societies, citizens know very little about how decisions are made and have no desire to learn.  In 
this situation they consider themselves “subjects of the government rather than participants with a 
legitimate voice in deciding what the government does.”53  These dimensions are a valuable 
foundation for future studies of political culture and will later be used to analyze this study’s 
findings. 
 This study also focused on differences among groups within one national culture and the 
process of disaggregating the political culture of a society.  They analyzed elites and masses 
separately in order to study the differences or similarities between them in each country.  They 
examined the political culture of six countries: Turkey, India, England, Ethiopia, Egypt and Japan 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., 542. 
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and found multiple political cultures in each.54  These findings have laid the foundation for later 
empirical studies to compare political cultures of sub-groups including elites and masses using 
behavioral approach.  They emphasize the importance of statistically significant survey research 
that adheres to strict methodological guidelines to produce quantifiable results.  The intent is to 
illuminate researcher personal bias and develop scientifically sound conclusions that can be 
replicated and verified.  The behavioral approach has considerable scientific merits especially 
with regard to its methodological accuracy and generalizability.  Nevertheless, behavioralism 
alone can not fully capture the complexity of issues inherent in social science and political culture 
in particular.  Comprehensive qualitative and area studies approaches add the depth and rich 
detail crucial to the study of a society as well as the political attitudes of individuals within that 
society. 
 In Political Culture and Political Development, Leonard Binder examines the political 
culture of Egypt after the 1952 National Revolution.  In the early 1960s, during the Nasser 
regime, Binder found that university graduates seemed to have a general liberal and parliamentary 
attitude regarding politics.55  Both the educated citizens and government leaders were attempting 
to mix traditional Egyptian values with the values of the West.  They sought to modernize 
without sacrificing important social and personal values related to tradition.56  The government 
chose to sacrifice traditional values in order to face its problems and international environment.  
That caused educated Egyptians to keep their traditional sentiments as private affairs and in areas 
of their social life.  Traditional values were not for public discussion or of concern of the 
54 Ibid. 
55 Leonard Binder, “Egypt: The Integrative Revolution,” in Political Culture and Political Development, 
eds. Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 442. 
56 Ibid., 403. 
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government.  Demographic and economic problems facing the government as well as the dignity 
of the nation were of central importance, not the personal matters of the individual.57
 The result was a political culture of educated Egyptians as one that did not identify with 
the acts of the government.  The private lives of the educated were only minimally integrated 
with their political lives.  Educated Egyptians perceived the government as “the private affair of 
President’s Nasser’s own inner circle”58 making it nearly impossible to enter this inner circle of 
trusted advisors.  That the individual must adjust to what the government decides to do even if 
considered unsatisfactory.  Governmental decisions should be tolerated even if they are 
uncomfortable to the individual because it is most likely what is good for Egyptians.59
 Binder also explained how Egyptians from the educated classes consider their 
government as a source of pride regarding its international accomplishments.  They were quiet 
pleased with the increased influence of Egypt in international affairs.  The fact that the great 
powers such as Britain and France took great interest in Egypt and rather concerned about the rest 
of the Middle East added to this sense of pride.  Most importantly, they understood that the 
neighboring Arab states feared and respected Nasser as a leader in the Arab world.60  The 
increased prominence of Egypt in the international arena delighted these citizens who were 
subjected to colonial rule for many years prior. 
 Nevertheless Binder maintains that the political culture of this sub-group of Egyptian 
society was largely based on the idea of disassociation with the political process.  Political 
support for the Nasser regime was, for the most part, passive and lacking opportunities for 
participation rendering the government, “relatively distant, cold object hover much its leaders 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., 400. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
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may appear psychologically familiar and warm.”61  The educated individual cannot participate in 
the Egyptian government as a member of a group offering an alternative policy.  This is because 
there is only one policy and everyone must conform to it.  The only way special interests can be 
pursued, is if an organization that represents those interests has the ability to penetrate the 
exclusive administration of the government bureaucracy.62  This created a situation in which the 
educated in Egypt accommodated themselves to the policies of the government without 
participating in the political process.    
 Binder also explained Egyptian political culture as an interactive mix of the distinctive 
orientations of many groups such as the middle and lower class as well as the bureaucratic elite.  
These findings provide evidence that sub-groups within a society may have different political 
cultures and varying perceptions.  This reiterates the importance of the present analysis that 
explores the perceptions of members of distinct sub-group in Egypt. However, Binder’s study is 
quite outdated and does not account for recent changes in the international and domestic arena.  
The current interview research explores whether the respondents still feel disconnected with their 
government today and whether they continue to show signs of apathy towards the political 
process. 
 Another more recent work was conducted by Joshua Stacher in the summer of 2001 in 
The Arab Studies Quarterly.  He examines the contemporary political culture in Egypt by 
studying the political beliefs and values of two separate groups in society, the elites and the 
masses.  He defines the 'masses' with terms such as the “popular” sector, “man in the street”, or 
the “silent majority” and the elites as “intellectuals who are educated and frequently writing or 
61 Ibid., 402. 
62 Ibid. 
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publicly commenting on political events or trends in contemporary Egypt.”63  His aim was to find 
the cause for the apathetic political culture often alienated from the political process during the 
current Mubarak presidency.  His theory rests on the idea that Egyptian political culture is not 
conducive to democracy due to the repressive government that alienates the masses as well as the 
elite to prevent the development of grassroots movements for democracy. 64
 Stacher offers many reasons to account for the apathetic Egyptian society. He first 
identifies many tactics used by Egyptian political leadership to stifle democratic political culture 
among the masses often called the “silent majority.”65  The Egyptian government deters political 
participation through intense media campaigns that negatively depict members of civil society 
groups, especially in the area of human rights, often by referring to them to as immoral or 
thieves.66  Fear of punishment is also used as a tool to keep people to stay away from non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and political activist groups.67  This further suppresses any 
prospects for democratic political culture by deterring citizens from working with human rights 
activists or participating in pro-democracy groups.  Other repressive government measures in 
Egypt are more direct.  Teachers who have attempted to conduct workshops on the use 
democratic tools in the classroom, for example, have been detained for up to 24 hours and 
punished by taking 15 days of pay off their salaries.68  Punishment is also used by the government 
to exclude and isolate members of society from politics and nongovernmental organizations.  
 This type of system has a devastating effect on a democratic political culture and on 
democracy as a whole.  People who are attempting to participate in the politics through formal 
channels become frustrated and disenchanted by the entire political process.  The results is that 
63 Joshua A. Stacher, “A Democracy With Fangs and Claws and Its Effects on Egyptian Political Culture,” 
in Arab Studies Quarterly 23, no. 3, (2001): 85, 83-99. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
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accepting authoritarianism becomes and easier choice and therefore, emerges as the normal and 
acceptable behavior.69  As a result, it is a common phenomenon in Egypt to be politically 
apathetic and personally uninterested in the state and its political activities. 
 Stacher’s field research continues an analysis of Egyptian political culture by 
concentrating on a very significant group in society with regards to democratic ideals, the 
intellectuals.  He suggests that since the 1952 national revolution, political and economic changes 
have affected Egyptian intellectual society.  They have lacked a unified vision, which has 
reinforced the mass culture of political alienation and immobilization.70  These intellectuals are 
divided and are unable to reach a consensus about what an acceptable government constitutes.  
This shows that there are indeed separate sub-groups within Egypt that may have a distinct 
political culture. 
 This study show that the divisions within Egyptian intellectual political culture lack 
direction and unity about how to lay the foundations of democracy and result in an inability to 
force the existing regime to make significant reforms.  One branch of elites favors what he refers 
to as the “Arab Concept” of democracy instead of the Western approach, in which powerful 
ruling elite would have ability to mobilize the masses while not being susceptible to checks and 
balances like in many Western democracies.  The lack of governmental checks and balances 
describes a system resembling an elitist form of democracy.  Others believe that democracy 
requires a pan-Arab nation while another sect equates democracy with social justice. These 
substantial divisions in Egyptian intellectual circles have done very little to promote a unified 
voice for democratic progress or promote a democratic political culture among the masses.71   
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., 90. 
71 Ibid. 
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 Stacher sees the presidencies of Nassar, Sadat, and Mubarak as maintaining and 
strengthening authoritarianism after independence from colonialism and the establishment of an 
independent nation-state in 1952.  He attributes their leadership as contributing to the present 
state of society saying that their reign: 
Helps explain the apathetic, alienated, and immobile mass political culture, in 
combination, with the ambivalent behavior and schizophrenic attitudes of the intellectual-
elite sub-group who appear to become more entrenched in the system.72   
 
Thus, he concludes accurately, that the lack of clear direction and aim of the Egyptian political 
culture allows the unrepresentative political system to prevail unchallenged.  He believes that the 
widespread apathy among society is a consequence of historical and contemporary events that 
have affected their beliefs and values about democracy.   
 Stacher’s work provides a comprehensive study of the political culture of Egyptian 
society.  The apathetic nature among intellectuals can be seen as a consequence of historical and 
contemporary events that influence their beliefs and values about democracy.  His study does not 
examine the possible effects of external events on political culture.  These findings provide a 
valuable framework for even more current research of Egyptian society and political culture that 
takes into account perceptions of outside forces such as U.S. democratization policy. 
   
Mass Public Opinion Surveys 
  
 Mass public opinion surveys have been conducted throughout the Middle East in order to 
examine the political culture of the general population.  A large sample of respondents that is 
randomly selected allows for a valuable generalization to be made about the larger population.  
One public opinion poll found the Egyptian political culture to be apathetic in a 1995 study 
72 Ibid., 92. 
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conducted by the Egyptian newspaper, Al-Ahram Weekly.73  The poll sampled the views of 1,505 
randomly chosen men and women from Cairo’s two main railway stations in Ramses and Giza 
and assured of anonymity.  Those surveyed varied in both age and education level. There were 
mixed results regarding domestic political issues and the Egyptian multi-party system.  Support 
for the multi-party system was evident as 73 percent agreed that it was beneficial with only 14 
percent disagreeing and 13 percent with no opinion.  This contradicts the results of another 
question that asked if the current multi-party system under Mubarak was useful as only 36 
percent agreed with that statement and the larger 46 percent replied that it was not.  Political 
alienation was confirmed further when only 36 percent could identify a political party that 
represented them and 40 percent claimed that no political party represented them.74  These 
answers are surprising given the fact that Egypt maintains that there are fourteen fully-
functioning political parties.  The reality, however, is that these parties are substantially 
ineffective because they do not represent the interests of many Egyptian citizens who feel 
completely disassociated with them and desire to remain outside of the political system.  
 Another opinion poll conducted by the Group for Democratic Development in October 
1996 surveyed 5,100 respondents in seven electoral districts in Egypt by random sampling 
methods.75  This survey found that 88 percent of those surveyed were not participating or 
affiliated with a political party and 94.32 percent were not participating or affiliated with a civil 
society organization.76  These findings support the argument that the masses in Egypt are indeed 
apathetic and uninterested in changing in the political status quo. 
73 Nader Fergany, “Yes to Pluralism, No To Violence,” Al-Ahram Weekly (29 December 1994-4 January 
1995). 
74 Ibid. 
75 Public Opinion Poll, The Group for Democratic Development, “Before Its Too Late; Field Study on 
Political Participation in Egypt,” prepared by Hafez Abu Saada (Cairo, Egypt: 1997), 17.  
76 Ibid. 
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 The findings in these polls show clearly that there is little of support for political parties 
in Egypt.  The majority of citizens do not utilize political parties as a tool for meaningful 
participation.  Stacher attributes this to society’s general perception is that the political parties are 
as autocratic as the government and not representative of the diverse sectors of society.77  He 
blames the Mubarak government for contributing to this gap by enacting restrictions and financial 
obstacles for opposition parties ultimately preventing them from mobilizing vital popular 
support.78   
 Recent studies of political culture and public opinion account for more recent global 
events like September 11th and the U.S.-led war in Iraq.  Survey research shows that mass public 
opinion in the Arab world has become increasingly skeptical of American intentions in the 
region.  One researched public opinion in 44 countries between July and October 2002.  It was 
conducted by The Pew Global Attitudes Project is called “What the World Thinks in 2002: How 
Global Publics View Their Lives, Their Countries, The World, America.”79  It has contributed 
very significant findings about perceptions around the world. For the purpose of this study, only 
findings from Egypt are relevant and will be discussed.   
 Conducted in October 2002, this survey was conducted in Cairo and its surrounding 
areas.  The questions were asked in face-to-face interviews spoken in the Arabic language with 
the respondents being adults between the ages of 18-60.  The total sample size was 1,013 with a 
3.1% margin of error.80  Its results show that the great majority of Egyptians have an unfavorable 
view of the U.S.  The results show that 69 percent had an unfavorable view and only 6 percent 
had a favorable view (compared to Telhami’s survey that found 79 percent and 13 percent 
77 Stacher, 88. 
78 Ibid., 95 
79 Public Opinion Poll, The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “What the World Thinks in 
2002: How Global Publics View Their Lives, Their Countries, The World, America,” (Washington D.C.: 
2002), 1-89. 
80 Ibid. 
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respectively).  When compared to opinions about Americans, Egyptians surveyed showed views 
nearly as negative with only 13 percent expressing a favorable view. The Pew Research Center 
also found that in Egypt, Muslims are more likely to have an unfavorable view of the U.S. than 
non-Muslims.81  In regards to the U.S. foreign policy and specifically the war on terror, the results 
are also significant.  When asked if U.S. foreign policy considers others, only 17 percent of 
Egyptians answered ‘yes’ and 66 percent answered ‘no’.  Egyptians surveyed had an even more 
negative view of the U.S.-led war on terrorism with only 5 percent favoring it and 79 percent 
opposing it.82
 When asked about their view regarding the spread of American ideas and customs, 
Egyptians surveyed gave some the most negative impressions of all the countries surveyed (only 
Pakistan showed a less positive view).  Only 6 percent of all Egyptian respondents felt that the 
wide diffusion of U.S. ideas and customs was a good thing.83  The question about U.S.-style 
democracy was permitted in all countries surveyed except Egypt, which shows the censorship of 
Egyptian government.  Overall the Egyptians surveyed had some of the most negative views of 
both U.S. policies and ideas.  This leads one to believe that the Egyptian government’s alliance 
with the U.S. is not representative with the wishes of the majority of its people. 
 Other significant findings include the latest in a series of surveys by the Pew Research 
Center for the People and the Press.  It researched a wide variety of countries besides the U.S. 
including European countries such as Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia as well as 
Turkey, Morocco, Jordan, and Pakistan from the greater Middle East and North Africa.84  
Telephone interviews were conducted among adults (18 years or older) as a representative 
nationwide sample of 1,000 in the U.S., 500 in Great Britain, 504 in France, and 500 in 
81 Ibid., 57. 
82 Ibid., 59. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Public Opinion Poll, The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “A Year After Iraq War: 
Mistrusts of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists” (Washington D.C.: 2004). 
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Germany.85 Face-to-face interviews were conducted from a representative nationwide sample of 
1,000 adults in Jordan, 1,002 in Russia, and 1,017 in Turkey while the sample of 1,000 adults 
interviewed in Morocco was solely urban and in Pakistan, predominately urban.86
 Conducted from February 19 to March 3, 2004, the survey showed discontent with 
America and its policies increasing even further since the war in Iraq in both Europe and the 
greater Middle East.  Most respondents from countries other than the U.S. expressed significant 
skepticism of U.S. motives for its anti-terror campaign.  The predominantly Muslim countries still 
remained angry toward the U.S. with majorities in all four countries doubting the sincerity of the 
war on terrorism saying that the policy is an effort to control oil in the Middle East and dominate 
the world.  Oil is mentioned most often as a U.S. motive for the war on terror with a majority in 
seven of the nine countries making that claim.87   
 The survey also found that the majorities in five countries surveyed say that the U.S. war 
on terrorism has been enacted so that it can dominate the world including Jordan (61%), Turkey 
(61%), and Morocco (60%).  Approximately half of the respondents from Muslim countries give 
two other ulterior motives for the American anti-terror campaign such as, “helping Israel and 
targeting unfriendly Muslim governments.”88  This shows that there has been little change in the 
opinions of respondents in these countries about the war in Iraq with opposition nearly universal. 
 Another interesting finding shows that Americans have a far different view of the impact 
of the war in Iraq than do all other people in the other surveyed countries.  While Americans 
generally believed that the Iraq war has helped the fight on terrorism, there is a broad agreement 
among other countries that it actually hurt the anti-terror campaign.89  Another point of 
divergence is the impact of the Iraq war on America’s image in the world.  The majority of 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid., 18. 
88 Ibid., 2. 
89 Ibid. 
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Americans felt that the war showed the power of the U.S. military and revealed their country as a 
trustworthy supporter of democracy around the world while at least half of the respondents in the 
eight other countries view the U.S. as less trustworthy and its military prowess generally not 
viewed in a positive light as a result of the war.90  There is a wide gap of perceptions between 
many in the greater Middle East (and in Europe) and the majority of Americans.   
 Other interesting public opinion poll findings include research conducted by the Gallup 
Poll organization three months after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  Ten thousand 
residents of nine predominantly Muslim countries were interviewed face-to-face.  The results 
show that 74% of respondents did not believe that the Arabs were involved with the September 
11th terrorist attacks.91  There was a great deal of skepticism among those surveyed about who 
were responsible for the attacks on the U.S.  Egypt was not included in this particular survey 
making it unclear whether Egyptians would also fall into this category 
 Cameron Brown provides a thorough analysis of this Gallup Poll in the article, “Middle 
Eastern Anti-Americanism, September 11 and After.”  Three main events are explained to 
account for the anti-American sentiment among Arabs and Muslims: reactions to the September 
11th terrorist attacks, U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, and 2003 Gulf war in Iraq.92  This paper 
claims that reactions in the Middle East are distinct from those of the rest of the world for two 
reasons. The first is the idea that the majority of Middle Eastern reactions placed the blame 
primarily on mistaken U.S. foreign policy rather than on the mistaken doctrines of the terrorists.93  
90 Ibid., 5. 
91 Public Opinion Poll, Gallup Poll Organization, “Poll of the Islamic World: Sept. 11 Morally 
Unjustifiable?” 5 March 2002, [database on-line] available from 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/tb/goverPubl/20020305b.asp (accessed 7 June 2004). 
92 Cameron Brown, “Middle Eastern Anti-Americanism, September 11 and After,” in Loathing America, 
eds. Barry Rubin and Judy Colp Rubin (Israel: The Gloria Center, 2004), 95, 95-118. 
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Since U.S. foreign policy is perceived as the root cause of the attacks, they suggest that the U.S. 
should learn from this experience and change its disruptive policies in the region.94   
 The second feature that distinguishes the general reaction in the Middle East concerning 
the September 11th attacks deals with Arab self-conception. The majority of people in the region 
feel that they have been victims of aggression by various powers for many years.  Although the 
region formally condemned the attacks and expressed regret for the loss of American life, Brown 
continues, the widespread notion was that the U.S. was experiencing only a small fraction of the 
pain that has been felt by Arabs for many years.  He cites a widely circulated newspaper in 
Amman, Jordan called Al-Ra’y, described this sentiment by stating,  
Perhaps what happened in the United States yesterday should serve as a reminder of the 
ongoing acts of oppression, aggression, killing, suppression, and starvation in the land of 
Palestine.95
 
Other newspapers like Al-Safir in Beirut, Lebanon have also cited raids by American fighters in 
Iraq, Libya, and Lebanon as additional examples of how U.S. foreign policy has continuously 
victimized Arab people.96
 The most significant contribution in Brown’s work to the present study is the discussion 
of widespread conspiracy theories permeating throughout the entire region. Writers suggested 
various extraordinary schemes about concerning who was really responsible for the attacks.  One 
conspiracy theory claimed that the attacks must have been orchestrated by someone within the 
insider knowledge of U.S. aviation and communication systems such as the U.S. government 
itself.  While others claimed that the accuracy and preciseness of the attacks concluded that there 
94 Ibid. 
95 Al-Ra’y (Jordan) 12 September 2001.  
96 Al-Safir (Lebanon) 15 September 2001. 
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must have been bombs strategically planted inside the buildings by domestic American 
extremists.97  
 The most repeated conspiracy theory in the region in the media and among average 
citizens deemed the Israelis as perpetrators of the attacks.  The rationale behind the Israeli attack 
was perceived as a means to “push the American people, President Bush, and NATO to submit 
even more to the Jewish Zionist ideology…”98  Some thought that even if the Arabs were 
responsible for the attacks, the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad was behind them.  The 
motivation was described as follows, “The Israeli regime knows that only by inflicting such a 
wound and blaming it on ‘Islamic terror’ could it wipe out any dissent to current American 
policy.”99  The prevalence of these conspiracy theories continued in the region despite the 2001 
Al-Jazeera broadcast of a videotape showing Al-Qaeda terrorist leader, Osama Bin Laden, 
gloating about the success of the attacks.100
 Brown explains that while there may be a variety of competing theories and 
disagreements about who was responsible for the terrorist attacks, there seems to be widespread 
agreement in the region that the Arabs or the Muslims could not have been responsible.  Many 
Middle Eastern writers and journalists claim that no one in the Arab world is skilled or capable 
enough to perform such a complex operation. This illustrates that Arab self-conception is that of 
being incompetent and incapable. 101
 While Brown’s work provides an insightful analysis of conspiracy theories in the Middle 
East after September 11th, it neglects to provide a comprehensive analysis of what shapes their 
perceptions.  She fails to give useful answers as to the reasons behind this self-conception of 
incompetence.  By not thoroughly examining the reasons behind the conspiracy theories, Brown 
97 Brown, 110. 
98 Al-Dustur (Jordan) 13 September 2001. 
99 Jomhuri-ye Eslami (Iran), 13 September 2001. 
100 Brown, 112. 
101 Ibid., 113. 
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seemingly depicts Arabs as irrational and illogical.  The present study seeks to fill these gaps by 
providing a thorough analysis of the perception of each respondent including how and why they 
were formed. 
 While these surveys provide valuable data as to ‘what’ the perceptions are of the general 
mass population, they fail to give sophisticated answers as to ‘why’ and ‘to what extent’.  They 
do not allow each respondent the freedom to use their own words to describe events, feelings, 
opinions, and interpretations.  They must choose a close-ended answer that best describes their 
perception, in effect, not allowing a unique personal narrative to develop and standardizing the 
concept of perception. 
   
Perspectives of Two Egyptian Intellectuals 
 
 There have been interviews conducted with individual people in Egypt allowing them to 
express their unique perception of the U.S. and its foreign policies.  A recent 2003 interview with 
one of Egypt’s best known intellectuals, Ahmed Kamal Aboulmagd, in the New York Times 
clearly expresses the “Arab world’s despair.”102  The former Senior Aid to former President Sadat 
and consultant to the United Nations and has spent more than twenty years working on projects 
aimed at promoting dialogue between Western and Arab civilizations.  He claims that America’s 
Arab friends have never felt so estranged from the United States.  He says that “people in Egypt 
and many parts of the Arab world used to love America, and now they have a sense of being 
betrayed, misunderstood, and taken lightly.”103   
 Like many Egyptian intellectuals of his generation, Aboulmagd has studied American 
democracy and political values and has long considered it a model to follow.  His view seems to 
102 Susan Sachs, “Egyptian Intellectual Speaks of Arab World’s Despair,” New York Times, 8 April 2003, sec. 
B. 
103 Ibid. 
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be rapidly changing as a reaction to current U.S. foreign policy.  Aboulmagd claims that he can 
no longer defend the U.S. in the present situation and says, 
To most people in this area, the United States is the source of evil on planet earth.  And 
whether we like it or not, it is the Bush administration that is to blame.104   
 
He claims that the U.S.-led war in Iraq is widely seen by the Arab world as an attack on all Arabs 
and Muslims by President Bush and his fellow Christians.  As an intellectual that has previously 
pushed for American ideals, Aboulmagd says that he is unable to do so anymore because of the 
widespread mistrust of the U.S. throughout the region.   
 Aboulmagd belongs to a sub-group of educated Egyptians that could serve as a pro-
democracy partner for the Bush administration’s policy in the Arab world.105  Such language from 
a long-time moderate among the Egyptian elite can be seen as a warning sign of the deep distress 
among many in the Arab world.  Similar opinions are common among Arab businessmen, 
university professors, and senior government officials.  These are precisely the people that could 
help the Bush administration’s mission to bring democracy to the entire Middle East.106  This 
interview provides an in-depth view of one individual’s perception and may be similar to others 
in Egypt. 
 A similar 2004 article in the Christian Science Monitor presents the perception of Ahmed 
Ibrahim, an Egyptian businessman of who also used to love America and had always dreamed of 
living there.107  In the past, he had always thought of the U.S. as a good model for Egypt to follow 
and imagined similar freedoms for both himself and his family.   
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
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 Over the past year, Ibrahim says has changed his perspective calling the U.S. “an enemy 
of democracy in his region.”108  As a successful businessman in his mid-30s, he believes that the 
U.S. no longer stands for democracy.  He points to previous U.S. policies as reasons for the 
change in his attitude.  He describes how the U.S. once supported the Shah of Iran as the leader of 
the country before abandoning him.  He makes a similar argument regarding the shift in U.S. 
policy towards Saddam Hussein.  The Iraq example is used as an example of how the U.S. again 
betrayed its past alliance with Hussein by overthrowing his entire regime.109  These contradictory 
U.S. policies are used as examples of hypocrisy and reasons of why not to trust America’s 
intentions in the region today.   
 Ibrahim’s stance is that the U.S. is not consistent between its rhetoric and its actions and 
therefore, he deduces, there must be other hidden motives.  He claims that the U.S. may proclaim 
democracy, but its hidden agenda involves controlling the Arabs in the Middle East.  He 
emphasizes his suspicion by saying, “now that I look back, we can see that the plan to control us 
has been there all along” and “they’re just shuffling Arabs around like pieces on a game 
board.”110  He claims that anti-American opinions are so intense that they are actually becoming 
an all-encompassing worldview.111  The idea that the U.S. has motives to control the Middle East 
has increasingly permeated throughout the region throughout the past few years and especially 
since the 2003 war in Iraq.   
 The article sites two U.S. policies as the main causes for Arab animosity towards the U.S.  
The policies towards the Palestinians and Iraq are causing the most frustration and anger in the 
Middle East. Ibrahim continues his argument by criticizing the present deteriorating situation of 
U.S. presence in Iraq.  He claims that the U.S. does not intend to bring democracy to Iraq but 
108 Ibid. 
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rather is an effort to secure oil and assert its military dominance. “Now they say they’re bringing 
democracy to Iraq, but it’s just getting worse and worse.”112   
 As part of Egypt’s small middle class, Ibrahim would be an ideal partner for the U.S. who 
plans to foster democratic transformation in the region.  He is not as subject to the lure of 
extremist religious ideologies and genuinely wants his government to institute reforms.113  
Although he is a moderate in the region, he clearly does not trust U.S. intentions as the champion 
of democracy.  Losing credibility in the eyes of moderates like Ibrahim will damage U.S. interests 
in the region and possibly make their objectives in the region unachievable.114  This is another 
individual interview that allows for an analysis of only one person’s opinions and feelings about 
the U.S. and its policies.  It does not allow for a valuable comparison with other moderates in 
Egypt.  The study of perception and political culture requires various methods of analysis to fully 
capture its complexity. 
 The study of political culture has a history dating back to the l960s with work of Pye and 
Almond.  It set the foundation for future works by highlighting the importance of psychological 
judgments for the political functioning of a society.  Its findings were simplistic and assumed that 
the political culture with be uniform throughout society.  Pye and Verba’s study provided a more 
nuanced approach by taking into account that elites and masses would have different political 
cultures and examined a wider variety of countries.  Sidney Verba has provided useful 
dimensions to analyze political culture.   However, this study is quite outdated and does not 
account for current political culture. 
 Poll research conducted in the Middle East has shown to be a good indicator of 
perceptions of the masses in the relatively understudied region.  It quantifies the findings of the 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
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close-ended questions for a representative sample of the entire population.  The interviews that 
have been cited above can be reduced to anecdotal evidence.  The do not use systematic 
methodology among several cases.  It is therefore incapable of method of comparison without the 
ability to find patterns among perspectives. One individual interview lacks the ability to 
consistently examining many subjects using the same questions.  It does not provide meaningful 
data to be analyzed and will not contribute social science research more broadly.  
 Qualitative interviewing of individual educated Egyptians seeks to fill these gaps found 
in previous research.  It highlights the importance of a comprehensive approach to political 
culture.  The concept of democratization is explored through the eyes of members from the 
educated elite in Egyptian society.  The interviews provide what poll research lacks; a nuanced 
and comprehensive approach to complex meanings and interpretations which are unique to 
personal narratives.  This method provides answers to why opinions have been formed using the 
respondents’ own words.  It penetrates the mind of individuals within a vital group in a political 
culture model and provides a deeper understanding of the evaluative and normative aspects of 
their perceptions. 
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CHAPTER 3   A CONCISE HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 
 
 To truly understand Egyptian perceptions of U.S. foreign policy and democratization 
today, a special emphasis must be given to the historical events that have helped shape them 
throughout the years.  These past experiences have influenced the way in which each respondent 
views the U.S. and democratization and the normative judgments that accompany them.  
Egyptians today are aware of past experiences of British colonialism and are significantly 
affected by the Arab-Israeli conflict and the U.S. role in the conflict as well as the second Gulf 
war in Iraq.  Egyptian political culture cannot be examined until these events and their impacts on 
political beliefs have been addressed.   
 Egyptians today are well aware of their ancient civilization that thrived under the reign of 
the Pharaohs thousands of years ago.  They are very proud of their long history and are described 
by Joseph Lorenz as people with “dignity and self-assurance” which is obvious by “the 
impression they give of knowing who they are and what their culture represents”.115  He claims 
that this comes from an identity that has been shaped by a variety of factors.  Similar to that of 
other Middle Easterners, their identity is shaped partly by Islam, the connection with other Arabs, 
and the victory over colonialism.  
 In the case of Egyptian identity there is the added consciousness that their civilization 
flourished for thousands of years before the birth of Western civilization making it a unique case 
in point.  Ancient Egyptian civilization is an underlining theme in every Egyptian’s view of 
115 Lorenz, 3. 
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themselves and the world.116  National identity is very strong as most citizens considering 
themselves distinctly Egyptian. One of the most significant factors that account for Egyptian 
leadership in the Arab world is the state-of-mind of the Egyptians themselves. Collectively, they 
have a great sense of national purpose that expects their government to assert its leadership 
among the other Arab states.117  They expect their regime to be involved in regional issues and 
play an active role in relations between its neighbors. 
 Egypt has largely remained socially, politically, and culturally dominated by an elite 
group since the ancient times.  The era of European colonialism, for example, allowed the British 
to control Egypt either directly or indirectly for over seventy years.  Before the British occupation 
in 1882, many in Egypt were headed toward constitutional rule and democracy including 
measures to limit the powers of the autocratic khedive.118  These moves toward democracy were 
stifled when the British sought to rule over what they saw as inferior people.  They reduced their 
educational budget for fear that they would become aware of their inferior status and demand 
nationalist ideals.119
 Forty years of British colonial rule of Egypt (1882-1922) continued a pattern of elite 
dominance in Egypt.  The structures of government institutions were in place without any real 
political power.  Constitutional rule and meaningful political participation was subdued.  The 
transition toward a sustainable democracy was never encouraged and most of Egyptian society 
largely left out of the political process.  Egypt’s experience with many years of colonialism has 
contributed to the lack democratic and political development by creating a political system that 
does not respond to the needs of its people.  Even after British occupation formally came to an 
end in 1922, Egypt’s domestic affairs were still dominated by the colonial power.  British forces 
116 Ibid. 
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still retained its military bases in Egypt and controlled the Canal Zone as well as the country’s 
foreign relations.120  They continued to restrict Egypt’s independence by interfering in domestic 
politics, which “in part prevented parliamentary government and its institutions from taking root 
in the political life of the country.”121
 The memories of colonial rule and the struggle for independence is still a very much alive 
in modern societies throughout the Middle East.  Many older Egyptians remember the days of the 
colonial era when they had to struggle for liberation from Western powers.  These lessons are 
communicated to younger generations through the national education curriculum, statues, 
museums, and other memorial tributes.122  The constant reminders of colonialism keep the 
memories of Western cultural dominance alive in order to protect themselves from ever being 
treated as inferior again.  The anti-colonial sentiment is crucial for understanding modern voices 
of opposition to Western powers.  It provides a backdrop to how Egyptians perceive the actions 
by dominant powers of the West today. 
 The anti-colonialism sentiment drove the Egyptian revolution in 1952 with a military 
group called the Free Officers taking over the country.  They were popular because of their 
nationalistic rhetoric that criticized the former ruling class for betraying the welfare of the country 
to foreign interests.  They promised to rid the Egypt from these foreign influences and broaden 
economic opportunities for citizens.  Since many of the Free Officers were not from the highest 
social classes, their rise to power altered the structure of wealth and distribution.  All three 
Egyptian presidents, Gamal Abdul Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak, were instrumental 
during this revolution.  They were among the new elite who, despite their promises, maintained 
the huge gap between the elite and the masses.  They maintained a similar political situation as 
120 Khalidi, 20. 
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before national independence with a generally unresponsive government and a Parliament with 
very limited powers. 
 While European powers were viewed negatively during the early nineteenth century, the 
U.S. was mostly seen by Middle Easterners as a “beacon of hope for those aspiring to democracy 
and freedom from foreign control.”123  The U.S. was seen as having no imperialist plans in the 
region and representing compassionate activities such as education and health care.  Even after 
becoming involved in World War II and establishing military bases in the region, the U.S. was 
still viewed positively as an anti-colonial power.124
 U.S. support for the Zionist movement began to change its positive image in the eyes of 
Middle Easterners.  As the Jewish nationalist movement, Zionism was an effort to create a nation-
state for Jews from around the world in the land of Palestine.  This strongly conflicted with the 
nationalistic aspirations of the Arab Palestinians.  As the colonial power, the British created a 
mandate that supported the Zionist aspirations and granted them 55 percent of Palestine.125  The 
Arabs rejected this situation based on principle and saw it as a new form of Western colonialism 
against them.   This anti-colonial mindset is what makes the creation of Israel such a highly-
charged issue for all Middle Easterners.   
 After World War II, the British decided to end the mandate and send the issue to the 
United Nations.  The result was a formal recognition of the Jewish state of Israel in the land of 
Palestine on May of 1948.  The U.S. was the first United Nations member to recognize Israel as a 
sovereign nation-state.  No other event has impacted modern Egyptian and Arab perceptions than 
the establishment of Israel in what is seen as Arab land.  The issue stems from the concept of 
123 Khalidi, 31. 
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identity for the collective consciousness of Middle Easterners.126  At a time when the region was 
still recovering from the memories of Western colonialism, the establishment of a Jewish state in 
the Middle East was particularly sensitive issue.  It went against the aspirations of those in the 
region and the plight of the Palestinians was seen as a human tragedy.127  T 
 he following day, the armies of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan invaded Israel in the name 
of the Palestinian cause.  The outcome of the war added to their sense of humiliation as the 
collective Arab armies were defeated by a country they perceived to be a small temporary state.128  
This was the first of five wars fought by Egypt and its Arab allies against Israel, all which ended 
with the same outcome of defeat and further humiliation. 
 Throughout many years Egypt has had a unique relationship with Israel, which has 
resulted in distinct reactions among Egyptians distinguishing their attitudes from those of other 
Arabs.  Since the 1930s, Egypt has committed the most effort and resources of all Arab states to 
resolve the Palestinian issue.  The pro-Palestinian policy is based on the idea that it is morally 
right to defend the Palestinians against the loss of their homeland.  That meant that for more 
than fifty years, Egypt lead the struggle on “behalf of the Palestinians which has translated into 
leadership in the Arab world.”129
 Egypt’s first President after the national revolution laid the foundation for how the 
Arab-Israeli conflict would be perceived by Egyptian for generations to come.  Nasser saw the 
conflict in Palestine within the framework of Western imperialism that sought to dominate 
Arabs.  He expressed great empathy for the plight of the Palestinians and claimed that it was 
Egypt’s duty to defend them.  He often said that Palestine “is not only an Arab but an Egyptian 
126 Shibley Telhami, The Stakes: America and the Middle East: The Consequences of Power and the 
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problem.”130  His anti-colonial statements were continuously made to all Egyptians blaming 
Western colonialism for displacing the Palestinians.131  This idea was entrenched in the minds 
of all Egyptians who could still vividly remember their subjugation under colonialism. 
  Nasser also used anti-colonial rhetoric to distract Egyptians from more pressing domestic 
problems such as the denial of human and democratic rights.  By pointing outward, citizens did 
not concentrate on the regime’s “failure to bring about greater equality and prosperity.”132  
Egypt’s domestic problems such as limited economic development, a growing gap between rich 
and poor, high unemployment, and widespread corruption133 continue to this day along with the 
government’s tendency to distract the public with injustices outside its borders especially relating 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
 Of all the wars fought with Israel, the June 1967 war or “Six Day War” has had the most 
impact on the Egyptian collective psyche.  The U.S. supported Israel’s invasion of Egypt that 
sought to bring about the overthrow of the Egypt’s Nasser regime, curb Arab nationalism, and to 
stop the Palestinian resistance movement.134  The humiliating defeat in less than a week 
devastated Egypt and cost thousands of casualties.  Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in the 
territories of the West Bank and Gaza came under Israeli occupation.135  The war ended hopes of 
a pan-Arab movement and allowed Israel to occupy additional land in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.   
Egypt lost its land in the Sinai Desert and its citizens were devastated.    
 The humiliating defeat of 1967 was one of the most significant turning points in modern 
Egyptian history.  As a result, the Egyptian government completely lost its legitimacy in the eyes 
of its citizens.  Egypt’s defeat and loss of territory was the main cause for the growth of 
130 Ibid., 24. 
131 Lorenz, 24. 
132 Khalidi, 69. 
133 Ali Rahnema, ed., Pioneers of Islamic Revival (London: Zed Books, 1994). 
134 Timothy Mitchell, “American Power and Anti-Americanism in the Middle East,” Anti-Americanism, 
eds. Andrew Ross and Kristen Ross. (NY: New York University Press, 2004), 91. 
135 Telhami, The Stakes, 102. 
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religiously inspired political activism.  Muslims began to view this humiliating experience as the 
culmination of 150 years of foreign intrusion in order to upset to their vision of a true Islamic 
community.  They began to lose faith in their government seeing it as incapable of protecting 
Arab interests against dominant powers. 
 Another result of the 1967 war was an increased U.S. political and military role in the 
Middle East.  The U.S. began supporting authoritarian governments as well as increasing its 
support for Israel who was seen as an enemy of the Arabs.  After the war, for example, U.S. aid to 
Israel increased by 450 percent.136  Resentment to various U.S. policies increased greatly because 
it, “went against the aspirations of many for a more unified and powerful Arab world, progressive 
governments, justice for the Palestinians, and reduced foreign influence.”137  Additionally, the 
supply of advanced military technology to Israel by the U.S. was seen as evidence of a U.S.-Israel 
alliance seeking to target the Arab world.  
 U.S. military support for Israel continued during the 1973 war launched by Egypt and 
Syria.  The coordinated attack was weakening Israel by causing it to retreat from the Sinai 
territory.  It was able to recapture the land and ultimately win the war because of U.S. massive 
airlift of military equipment that was sent to aid them.  It is widely understood among Egyptians 
today that their 1973 loss against Israel was due to American military backing.  Once again, 
Egypt was not able to claim victory on behalf of the Palestinians.  The failure to recover 
Palestinian territories and allow Israel to continuously expand and control Jerusalem has 
underlined for many Muslims the fact that they are unable to protect their lands and their religion 
from repeated assaults of an imperial West.”138
136 Stephen Zunes, Tinderbox: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Roots of Terrorism  (Monroe, ME: Common 
Courage Press, 2003), 161. 
137 Telhami, The Stakes, 53. 
138 John Esposito, Islam and Politics 4th ed., (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1998), 11-24. 
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 Under President Anwar Sadat, Egypt had no plans to be a leader of the pan-Arab cause.  
Instead he endorsed an ‘Egypt First’ policy in which he would make decisions based only on the 
national interests of Egypt.  Egyptians embraced this nationalistic policy after years of Nasser’s 
pan-Arab policies which they saw as “producing more costs and fewer benefits.”139  In 1978, 
Sadat’s ‘Egypt First’ policy translated into a peace treaty with the Jewish state of Israel.  His 
decision to make peace with Israel in the Camp David Accords was based on what he saw as 
Egyptian national interests.  This was hardly reflective of Egyptian public opinion at the time.  As 
the first Arab state to make peace with the state of Israel, Egypt quickly a U.S ally receiving 
billions of dollars of foreign aid every year.  The peace treaty also caused Egypt’s influence in the 
Middle East to decline as it was expelled from the Arab League by other Arab member states who 
felt betrayed by the act.  Although the two countries are formally at peace, the great majority of 
Egyptians today still do not agree with this policy.  Sadat ultimately gave his life for this peace 
treaty after he was assassinated in 1981 by Muslim extremists. 
 On the domestic front, Sadat continued the repressive domestic environment during a 
September 1981 crackdown on approximately 1,500 Egyptians from all sectors of society 
including both intellectuals and Islamists. He explained that citizens had to "understand that 
democracy has its own teeth. The next time is going to be ten times as ruthless."140
 Today both foreign policy and Egyptian political attitudes are identifying more with 
broader Arab world.  The increased identification with other Arabs in the region is based on 
pragmatism rather than idealism.  Arab unity is seen as beneficial for Egyptian political and 
economic interests.141  Egyptians are impacted by the Arab media that shows repeated images of 
Israeli human rights violations against Palestinian cities and villages including military closures, 
139 Ibrahim Karawan, “Identity and Foreign Policy: The Case of Egypt,” in Identity and Foreign Policy in 
the Middle East, eds. Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2002), 165. 
140 James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, eds., Politics in the Middle East 4th ed. (NY: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 1994), 224. 
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roadblocks, Jewish-only housing settlements, and targeted assassinations that have led to a 
devastated economy.142
 Under the reign of President Mubarak, Egypt can be defined as a “single-party 
bureaucratized state” where a single government party that dominates the political process.143  
Opposition parties are significantly restricted without the ability to effectively influence political 
decision-making.  The constitution, however, refers to the country as a democratic and socialist 
Arab republic in which the president is supported by a National Assembly of at least 350 
members.  The National Assembly nominates the president whose name is added to a national 
referendum for the general population.  To be declared president, the candidate must win a simple 
majority of votes.  The original constitution regulated a president to two six-year terms until it 
was amended by Sadat.  The amendment allows a president to be reelected for an unspecified 
number of terms.  Mubarak has benefited from this amendment having been “elected” for a fourth 
six-year term since 1981.144  This has led to the dominance of the executive and unchecked power 
of the state. 
 It is clear that modern perceptions in Egypt have grown out of 2,500 years of foreign rule.  
Every occupier had one characteristic in common; feelings of superiority toward the Egyptian 
people.145  Political culture today is strongly rooted in the anti-colonial past with a resistance to 
foreign control.146  After colonialism, Egypt’s government has been remarkably stable allowing 
each individual leader to remain in power for decades.  Consequently, political attitudes will stem 
from these historical factors shaping future perceptions regarding issues such as democratization.
142 Deborah J. Gerner and Jillian Schwedler, eds., Understanding the Contemporary Middle East 2d ed., 
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143 Ibid., 104. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Lorenz, 25. 
146 Khalidi, 29. 
 53
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4   RESULTS 
 
 
Demographic Analysis of the Interviews 
 
 The first method will analyze the respondents’ answers using demographic variables such 
as religion, political party affiliation, and whether a respondent has visited the U.S.  Background 
and demographic questions identify the characteristics of the person and help the interviewer 
understand a respondent in relation to other people.  Of the seven respondents, five were Muslim 
and two were Coptic Orthodox Christian.  It is appropriate that the majority of respondents be 
Muslim because the great majority of Egyptians (approximately 90 percent) follow Islam.  
Nonetheless, it is important to examine the two Coptic respondents and to find whether they 
shared similar perspectives about democratization and the U.S. role in the process. Do the Coptic 
Christian respondents share a sharply different viewpoint than the other Muslim respondents? 
 There has been a great deal of literature on whether religion affects the political culture in 
the Middle East.  Many scholars have concluded that Islam causes Middle Easterners to be anti-
Western, anti-democratic and anti-modern.  Simon Murden, for example, insists that Muslims 
need to synthesize with modernization that cannot be separated from Westernization in order to 
avoid what he deems as isolation and backwardness.147  Other scholars have also claimed that 
Islam is inherently incompatible with the West and will always be in opposition to it.  Feelings of 
anti-Americanism are seen as directly stemming from the Islamic faith.  Various Middle East 
experts have repeatedly written about Islam and its inability to incorporate Western ideas and 
principles without conducting substantial field studies in the region. 
147 Simon Murden, Islam the Middle East and the New Global Hegemony (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2002), 181. 
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 This study will deeply explore the political attitude of each participant to find whether 
religion is the driving force behind their opinion democratization.  After each respondent answers 
each question, they were allowed sufficient time to elaborate on what factors shape their 
particular viewpoint.  They had ample opportunity to explain the level of importance of their 
religious beliefs and personal values.  Do the Muslim respondents cite their faith as a point of 
conflict with the U.S. and its policies?  If not, what other factors accounts for their viewpoint?  
How does religion affect the perspectives of Coptic Christian respondents?  Answers to the 
questions will be compared in order to search for similarities and differences among respondents 
of both faiths. 
 The hypothesis is that religion will not play a significant role when respondents’ are 
asked to define of democracy.  The lack of political and social freedoms in Egypt has created a 
situation in which the majority of citizens have been conditioned to be uninterested in politics and 
especially issues concerning democracy.  Over time citizens have come to understand that it 
serves no purpose to discuss the subject of democracy.  It is considered an idealistic notion that 
has no bearing on the struggles of daily life.  In addition, issues pertaining to democratic theory or 
practices are not included in the general school curriculum.  Teaching democratic tenets in the 
education system would reveal the undemocratic practices of the Egyptian government and cause 
widespread discontent.  This would defeat an important goal of federal education, to protect the 
interests of the ruling regime.  Even in social circles, discussing issues relating to politics and 
democracy are seen as pointless. Therefore, whether Coptic Christian or Muslim, the respondents 
will most likely have a limited scope of democracy. 
 Based on previous research and historical studies, the great majority of respondents will 
not be affiliated with a political party.  While general apathy will probably be the main driving 
force, it is possible that religion will also have an effect on whether a respondent is involved in a 
political party.  Government restrictions on religious political parties like the Muslim 
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Brotherhood, has created a situation in which all parties are secular and not based on religious 
beliefs.  Secular parties would not be representative of a deeply religious person who believes that 
politics should be based on religious teachings.   
 Another hypothesis is that religion would not play a central role in how the respondents’ 
view U.S. democratization policy in the Middle East.  Their perceptions of 2003 War in Iraq and 
the Greater Middle East Initiative are expected to be based on ideas generally unrelated to their 
religious beliefs.  Rather, they will express opinions and feelings based on how they perceive 
U.S. actions and intentions.  Perceptions based on U.S. policies, makes it likely that Muslim and 
Coptic Christian respondents will have similar perceptions.  This is based on the idea that both 
will likely draw on a common Egyptian or Middle Eastern identity when faced with issues 
relating to the U.S., as a Western power, and new ideas of democratization.  U.S. foreign policies 
in the region especially in the Arab-Israeli conflict, 2003 War in Iraq, and 2002 invasion of 
Afghanistan will likely have the most negative influence on their perceptions. 
 Religion will mostly likely be a factor for Muslim respondents when asked about 
democratic reforms in their country.  For those that are receptive to America’s push for 
democracy in Egypt, they may also express a need to incorporate Islamic tenets in the reform 
process.  Given the secular and unrepresentative Egyptian government, Muslim respondents may 
see democratization as an opportunity to create political institutions or processes that are more 
representative of their religious beliefs.  Coptic Christian respondents, as small minority of the 
population, would object to a government based on Islamic tenets.  They would prefer religious 
equality and representation in the political system without a monopoly of only one religion.     
  The results of the interviews show that all but one respondent used simple and concise 
descriptions with only a few characteristics to describe their definition of democracy.  Neither 
Muslim nor Coptic respondents expressed an in-depth analysis of democratic processes or ideas.  
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This confirms the idea that regardless of faith, these respondents are not accustomed to discussing 
the concept of democracy. 
 The majority of respondents (five Muslims and one Coptic Christian) had very similar 
answers to all of the questions concerning the U.S.  They all cited numerous past U.S. foreign 
policies and described them as contradictory and hypocritical.  The policies were repeatedly used 
as reasons why they mistrust U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East today.  The Coptic 
respondent expressed the same negative sentiment citing similar examples as all other Muslim 
respondents.  He even articulates this idea saying, “This viewpoint has nothing to do with my 
religion. I am a Christian and will have the same opinion as a Muslim. It doesn’t matter what 
religion you are.”  This undoubtedly shows that this respondent expects both Muslims and Coptic 
Christians in Egypt to relate to a common identity and hold the same opinions of the U.S. and its 
policies.  This group of respondents falls in line with the hypothesis that Egyptians will share 
similar opinions of the U.S. and democratization regardless of their religion. 
 The hypothesis was not entirely correct, however.  There was one deviant Coptic 
Christian respondent who will be referred to as “Mariam”.  Her general worldview is heavily 
guided by an anti-Islamic sentiment.  Her words plainly expressed a great deal of animosity felt 
towards Muslims.  While her mannerisms were stern and serious throughout much of the 
interview, she would get heavily agitated when discussing Islam.  She explains that she has read 
the Q’uran (the Islamic Holy Scripture) three times and dislikes its teachings saying, “This is a 
religion? What a religion! God forgive them. They write about bad things, dirty ideas.”  This 
obvious abhorrence of the Islamic faith causes her to identify as a Christian rather than an Arab or 
Egyptian, which sets the backdrop for the rest of the interview. 
 She frequently mentions issues pertaining to religion and religious discrimination 
explaining that, “discrimination is terrible in Egypt. If a little Muslim boy sees me wearing a 
cross around my neck, he’ll make a face or gesture at me” and “Muslims also burn churches and 
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beat up priests.”  Mariam’s claims of religious discrimination imply that there is a significant lack 
of tolerance and pluralism in Egypt, which are necessary characteristics for a viable democracy. 
 When asked to define democracy, she briefly mentions freedom to write freely in the 
press.  She then immediately begins criticizing the lack of free speech in Egypt, “They [Egyptian 
government] say that you can say what you want, but you really can’t.”  She claims that the 
government shut down her newspaper company to emphasize the lack of freedoms in Egypt.  She 
then tells another personal story of how she grieved when a journalist of the Al-Ahram newspaper 
disappeared.  She explained about that he “spoke about what people want” and how she “cried so 
hard when he disappeared”.  Her personal stories of discrimination have made her feel 
disadvantaged in her country and it is clear that she is unhappy with the current status quo.   
Discrimination is clearly a very personal and sensitive issue for her that has influenced her 
perceptions regarding democratization. 
 Mariam’s answers to the many of the questions regarding the U.S. continue to diverge 
considerably from the rest of the respondents.  She is the only respondent with a positive opinion 
towards the U.S. government and the Bush Administration.  She expresses unwavering support of 
the U.S. and its presence in the Middle East.  This is partially based on her anti-Islam worldview 
and unhappiness with the domestic situation in Egypt. She blames the current domestic situation 
on Islam, “Egypt and the Middle East will always go backwards as long as Islam is dominant.” 
When asked about why the U.S. has enacted a democratization policy in the Middle East, Mariam 
explains it as rhetoric by the Bush Administration in order to achieve other goals.  She does not 
believe that the policy was put forth to promote democracy saying, “Bush pretends to care for 
them [Arabs] so that he can control them and bring them closer.”  Her view is similar to the rest 
of the respondents who also believe that the U.S. is deceiving Arabs.  However, the difference in 
Mariam’s reaction stems from a difference in identity.  For the others, the perception that the U.S. 
is deceiving Arabs causes them to have negative opinions of the U.S. because they consider 
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themselves Arabs as well.  In Mariam’s case, she refers to Arabs as “them” as a group 
disassociated from her own.  Throughout the interview, her tone was overtly condescending when 
describing Middle Easterners in relation to the U.S.  It is clear that she identifies with the West, in 
this case the U.S., rather than an Arab identity. 
 Mariam speaks of the U.S. in a tone that seems unapologetic and defensive.  She supports 
the U.S. saying plainly, “I love America” and citing various reasons for her positive view. She 
feels that the U.S. respects animals, people and have contributed greatly to the world’s 
technology.  Even though she believes that the U.S. policy is not sincere, she still supports the 
U.S. and its invasion of Iraq saying, “I respect Bush because he’s done nothing wrong. So the 
military is there [Iraq]. What has he done wrong?”  Her argument seems to blame the Iraqis by 
explaining how the U.S. cannot possibly leave Iraq because of the violence and beheadings.  She 
sees the U.S. military as forced to stay in the country because of the violent situation. 
 Mariam’s perception is obviously one that is highly driven by her personal anti-Muslim 
feelings with her own words unmistakably confirming that.  Her support of U.S. policy in the 
Middle East is linked to her perception that the Bush Administration is against Islam, and 
consequently, in line with her own personal views.  In relation to U.S. policy, she bluntly says, “If 
it’s a war on Islam, then I agree!”  The fact that she mentions the possibility that U.S. policy may 
be a “war on Islam” is significant and relates to some of the other respondents who consider U.S. 
policies as targeting Muslims. 
 Three Muslim respondents discussed religion throughout their interview.   When 
“Ahmed” was asked to give reasons for his negative attitude of the U.S. is based on, he says 
claims that it’s based on U.S. policies and not because of religion: 
Religion doesn’t guide my thinking. It doesn’t matter what religion someone is. I have 
both Muslim and Christian friends. It doesn’t matter. 
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However, later during this interview, he refers to the Q’uran claiming that it contains scriptures 
that predict a future U.S. invasion of Egypt.  He then explains how all Egyptians would defend 
themselves in response to a U.S. attack, “be sure that the 70 million [Egyptians] who are not able 
to eat, will still hold weapons.”  His tone at this time was quiet angry and outwardly aggressive 
seemingly trying to show Egypt’s strong national identity and willingness of the people to defend 
their homeland against outsiders.  It was clear that this paranoia comes from deep-seated fear of 
U.S. aggression and foreign control more generally.  He expresses this fear clearly when saying: 
We [Egyptians] leave Egypt because we are afraid of what will happen to Egypt. I have 
two children, a boy and a girl. I am afraid of what will happen to them. Not from Egypt, 
but from who will invade.  
 
Ahmed is overtly worried about an invasion of his country and continues to give more reasons 
why that scenario is possible.  He claims that the U.S. already occupies Egypt financially and 
politically giving it outdated technology to keep it from getting stronger.  He also points to the 
1967 June war as an example of how the U.S. and Israel will invade Egypt.  His paranoid 
sentiment is also extreme in other respects.  He says that he also respects or admires both Saddam 
Hussein and Osama Bin Laden who he sees as strong Arabs who had the courage to confront U.S. 
domination.  His views are more in-line with extremists and not common among mainstream 
Egyptians. 
 In terms of religion, Ahmed’s perspective shows somewhat of a contradiction.  While he 
clearly states that religion is not an important factor to him personally, a brief reference is made 
to his interpretation of the Q’uran as evidence of a future U.S. invasion of Egypt.  He also cites a 
number of past U.S. foreign policies to further establish his arguments.  While he claims that 
religion does not influence his perception, he makes other references that prove otherwise.  
Religion plays a bigger role in his perspective than he would like to admit.  Ahmad also says that 
“American democracy is not for Arabs”, which is similar to the perspectives of next two 
respondents.  
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 “Said” referred to Islam a few times when discussing a possible democracy in Egypt.  He 
expresses interest in America’s push for democracy in Egypt with what he calls “limits”, which 
entail the incorporation of Islam, “Any changes must include religion. We are Muslim and 
religious. It is the most important thing. We can fight years for religion.”  It is clear that he 
considers it essential to base future political changes in Egypt on religion.  He opposes the idea of 
a democracy in Egypt that is identical with that in the U.S. because of the nature of Egyptians 
who consider religion “the most important thing in life.” 
 After making the case for the importance of Islam, Said then feels the need to justify his 
religion.  This is partially due to his earlier comments about how Muslims can fight years for 
religion.  He explains Islamic teachings by saying that “it says violence can be used only in self-
defense, in the homeland.”  He also explains that Islam “can change over time” implying that 
Islam is not static and has the ability to adapt.  He continues by stating that it is not synonymous 
with terrorism. He also feels as though the U.S. government does not make the distinction 
between Muslims and terrorists.  He then calmly asks why the U.S. targets Islam over other 
Christian nations that have problems including wars and AIDS.  Obviously, Said sees the need to 
defend Islam against stereotypes and polices that both categorize and target Islam. 
 Another Muslim respondent also perceives the U.S. invasion of Iraq because it is 
targeting Muslims.  “Mohammed” says that in addition to other reasons,  
The war in Iraq is a war on Islam.  It is like the Crusades. Now that the Soviet enemy is 
gone, the U.S. has made Islam the enemy. 
 
He believes that U.S. government has considers Islam an enemy and the Iraqi war is a reflection 
of that.  His belief that Islam is being targeted by the U.S. is almost identical to Said’s. 
 Mohammed mentions Islam when discussing prospects for democratic reforms in Egypt.  
Like Said, Mohammed also emphasizes the importance of Islam in Egypt, “the belief in God here 
[Egypt] is very strong and cannot be ignored.”   He expresses his frustration the incorporation of 
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Islam in a reform process by saying that Egypt has no appropriate models to follow.  He 
expresses his frustration very calmly and logically when saying: 
There are some who say Islam is the way to rule the country. But there is still no good 
Islamic model to follow. Iran is a mess. Saudi Arabia is not even close. Turkey is not an 
Islamic country.  It’s totally secular. America is definitely not the model we will follow. 
We don’t trust them or what they say. 
 
He believes that Islam must be a part of any future reforms and does not know what direction 
Egypt is to proceed with reforms.  He is certain about one point however; that he does not trust 
the U.S. and therefore, does not welcome an American-style democracy in Egypt.  
 Ahmed, Said, and Mohammed all consider U.S. democracy as not suitable for Egypt.  
The central theme is that because religion is much more important for Egyptians, a completely 
secular democracy would be incompatible with their Islamic values.  They perceive U.S. 
democracy with skepticism as foreign idea that is not reflective of their core beliefs. 
 Another demographic variable is political party affiliation.  Membership in a political 
party may cause the respondents to be more knowledgeable about the domestic political system 
having been more exposed to it.  Members of an opposition party would have more negative 
views of the political system in Egypt due to the various obstacles created to restrict government 
participation.  They would be greater advocates for political reforms that will allow them more 
access to the political process.  Depending on their view of the U.S., they may also welcome 
America’s push for democratic reforms in Egypt.  Those affiliated with the dominant ruling party 
have a greater chance of being satisfied with the current political system in Egypt.  They are a 
part of the single most powerful body in the country with almost absolute power for the decision-
making.  They would be weary of America’s call for democratic reforms for fear of losing power. 
 Five respondents showed little interest or complete distain for the Egyptian political party 
system with two who were affiliated with a political party.  The respondent who was a member of 
the Wafd opposition party did, indeed, have negative views of the domestic situation in Egypt and 
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welcomed the U.S. democratization policy in Egypt.  This may be related to the lack of power of 
the political party and the restrictions enforced by the ruling party.  It is unclear to what extent 
political party affiliation influenced this respondent’s opinion about American calls for 
democracy.   
 The other respondent affiliated with a political party was a member of the ruling National 
Democratic Party.  The findings show that being a member of the ruling political party did affect 
the way the respondent illustrated the political situation in Egypt.  This respondent was unique in 
that he described Egypt’s political situation as largely democratic and representative.  He claimed 
that 70 percent of Egyptians, or 40 million people, voted during the last National Assembly 
elections.  This is an extremely high participation rate and highly unlikely for Egypt that has been 
cited for its apathetic political culture and corrupt election process.  His exaggerated numbers are 
used as an attempt to illustrate Egypt as a country that is already making significant democratic 
reforms.   He also showed a great deal of optimism when describing Egypt’s future.  He predicts 
that Egypt will continue to implement democratic reforms because of the younger members of the 
National Assembly who have been recently elected. 
 His portrayal of the improving democratic situation in Egypt was a result of the fact that 
he is a part of the ruling political party.  His motivation is to present the political situation 
positively in order to show that Egypt does not need outside assistance to enact democratic 
reforms.  Although he claims to welcome American calls for democracy, he claims that there are 
limits to these reforms. This confirms the hypothesis that expected a member of the ruling party 
to be more satisfied with the present domestic situation in Egypt than those who are not. 
 Another demographic category used for data analysis is whether the participants’ had 
visited the U.S. prior to the interview.  Theoretically, those who have previously visited the U.S. 
may have a more positive opinion of the U.S.  This may also translate into a more understanding 
view U.S. policy than those who have not visited the U.S.  Assuming that their experience was a 
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positive one, it may allow them to have a better understanding of American ideas, people, and 
culture that can contribute to feelings of greater sympathy.  Nevertheless, there is always the 
possibility that the exposure to the U.S. during a visit would have highlighted the cultural 
differences and affect the respondent the opposite way making them more hostile to American 
democratic values and ideals. 
 Of the seven respondents, only two had visited the U.S. many times prior to the 
interview.  Mariam expresses a very favorable view of the U.S. admiring U.S. inventions and 
praising Americans because they “have respect for many things” and believe that “everything has 
value.”  Saad has similar positive views of the U.S. and explaining that he enjoys going to 
America for vacation because “the country itself has a lot to offer.”  Clearly, both respondents 
attribute positive characteristics to America and take pleasure in visiting there often. 
 Despite their similar positive perceptions of America, the perceptions of these two 
respondents differ sharply with regards to U.S. policy in the Middle East.  Mariam supports the 
U.S. democratization policy in both Iraq and Egypt while Saad explains how the U.S. government 
is “immoral.” He says that he liked the U.S. in the past when he thought it “represented good 
values.”  He has since changed his view, he explains, because of U.S. policies, “Now when I 
think of America, I think of selfishness, greed, control that is obvious through their policies.”   
 Although both of these respondents had visited the U.S. many times, their opinions of the 
U.S. policies were very different.  Their perceptions of the U.S. government and its policies in the 
Middle East were not significantly shaped by their personal experiences visiting the U.S.  
Therefore, each respondent based their political attitudes on factors independent from their 
exposure to U.S. values and culture.   
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General Patterns and Themes 
 
 The second method of data analysis will outline patterns and themes that emerge from the 
data collected.  Similar concepts, interpretations, and meanings that were expressed by two 
respondents or more and are significant to the subject of political culture are outlined.  The first 
issue deals with each respondent’s definition of democracy.   
 The first question asks each respondent to describe their definition of democracy.  The 
respondents will be allowed the opportunity to provide their unique description of what the term 
means to them.  The manner in which each respondent defines and interprets democracy will set 
the stage for the rest of the interview dealing with democratization issues and policies.  The most 
comprehensive response was given by the respondent who has a university degree in political 
science and is part of the ruling political party.  The others named only a few characteristics to 
describe the concept.  The most frequent characteristic of democracy was described as free 
speech as the right to voice their opinions. 
 The emphasis on freedom of speech presents a general pattern among the six of the seven 
interviews.  Five of the respondents mentioned elections as part of democracy.  This may seem 
surprising that when given an opportunity to describe the concept of democracy in their own 
words, more respondents would mention the right to speak openly than the right to choose their 
leaders.  There are a number of reasons that may account for this discrepancy.   
 One reason that freedom of speech was mentioned most frequently is because is one of 
the partial freedoms granted in Egypt today.  The increased ability to voice an opinion publicly is 
a change that is obvious to the public and affects the daily life of citizens.  Most of these 
respondents are over the age of forty and remember much tighter restrictions on freedom of 
speech during the Nasser regime.  At that time, if they spoke openly about politics or criticized 
the government they could be arrested or detained.  This was a daily reminder of their oppressive 
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regime.  The fact that this is no longer the case today alleviates their daily fears making them feel 
as though they have true freedom. 
 Magued specifically discusses the restrictive measures imposed by Nasser saying, “We 
were scared to talk politics in our home…There was just fear.”  He explains that Egyptians have 
been granted the right to free speech by saying, “One day a person is cursing the president. The 
other is cursing the government. I’ll show you the newspapers today.”  He defines democracy 
only in terms of freedom of speech to show that Egypt is in fact democratic.  Since they have 
been granted the freedom to discuss politics, there is already a democracy in Egypt which is not 
in need of U.S. help to democratize.  He specifically says, “We don’t need someone from outside 
to help us change here. We are not like the days of Nasser anymore.”  By defining democracy 
only as freedom of speech, he was able to make the argument that Egypt was already democratic 
and was not in need of U.S. assistance to politically reform. 
 Mariam also defined democracy only in terms of freedom of print to support her 
argument as well.  She made the opposite claim about the freedoms in Egypt with a completely 
different view than Magued.  Her definition of democracy was described with contempt, “That if 
I write, they don’t break my pencil.”  She explains her past experience with the government who 
had stifled her freedom to write freely in an Egyptian newspaper.  Her argument is that because of 
the lack of freedom of speech in Egypt; the country is not democratic and therefore, in need of 
political reforms.  She is unhappy empty rhetoric of the Egyptian government that claims to allow 
its citizens to speak and write freely without actually doing so.  Her perspective is that without 
freedom of speech, there is no democracy in Egypt making it badly in need of democratization. 
 Both Magued and Mariam described democracy only in terms of freedom of speech as a 
means to describe their perception of the political situation in Egypt.  Their approach was to use a 
very simplistic definition in order to support their view.  Magued described democracy as 
freedom of speech to show that Egypt has already implemented democratic reforms while 
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Mariam used the same simple definition to prove that Egypt is not democratic.  Neither 
respondent mentioned elections and are the only two that are part of the Coptic Christian minority 
in Egypt.  They know that as members of the small religious minority in a predominantly Muslim 
country, they will most like be greatly disadvantaged in the event of an election.  Minorities often 
feel as though their interests will not be adequately represented in a democratic electoral system. 
 There is a significant discrepancy among Magued and Mariam concerning freedom of 
speech and whether the Mubarak regime allows Egyptian citizens to express dissent with the 
government.  There is also a disagreement among other respondents concerning their political 
rights and freedoms.  Similar to Magued’s stance, Saad asserts that newspapers are allowed the 
freedom to speak openly by saying plainly, “Mubarak allows freedom of speech in print.”  While 
Ahmed holds a completely different view regarding the right to speak openly in Egypt as he 
warns the researcher about the possible dangers associated with discussing political issues 
including arrest or detainment.   
 The obvious differences in how these respondents view their right to free speech are 
troublesome for democratization.  Perceptions are based on personal experiences with the 
Egyptian government rather than on an undisputed legal document such as constitutional law.  
The disagreement suggests that an individual’s rights are not widely understood among society, 
which allows the government to selectively enforce restrictions on free speech as they deem fit.  
The result is a partially free society where only views acceptable to the regime are openly 
expressed.  Views considered threatening or intolerable to the regime are repressed.  For example, 
the government allows constant anti-American, anti-Israeli, and anti-Semitic columns throughout 
state-owned newspapers.  Criticism directly toward the U.S. and Israel allows citizens to 
continuously place the blame outward and distracts them from greater domestic ills. 
 Ahmed makes a significant comment that indicates the existence of government 
nepotism.  After he warns the interviewer about a possible arrest by the Egyptian authorities, he 
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gives a scenario as to how this could happen.  He claims that turning someone in to the 
government would help someone who has personal aspirations to advance in the government 
bureaucracy.  The notion that there is possibility for a person to gain greater accessibility to the 
Egyptian government gives an indication of nepotism and is a serious detriment to the concept of 
the rule of law.   
 In terms of a democratic transition, the fact that more respondents mentioned free public 
discourse than elections to describe democracy is not of great concern.  Before elections can 
successfully take place, citizens must be informed and exposed to various political opinions and 
views.  A political culture that encourages public discourse and political debate is more tolerant 
and accepting of competing viewpoints.  Citizens will find peaceful ways to disagree as they are 
exposed to a wide array of ideas that accompany pluralism.  A tolerant political culture must be 
established first before elections can take place.  Otherwise, an election can destabilize an entire 
country by causing major conflict between people without a history of open and peaceful political 
dialogue.  To encourage a tolerant political culture, President Mubarak should open the state-
owned press to other voices throughout the country and tone down its anti-American and anti-
Semitic rants.148  Citizens will eventually begin discussing the injustices within the domestic state 
of Egypt rather than those outside their borders. 
 The next theme concerns the respondents’ affiliation with a political party. They were 
asked if they are affiliated with a political party and to give reasons why or why not.  They were 
given an opportunity to explain the reasons why they were not politically active. 
 The five respondents who were not involved with in a political party gave almost 
identical reasons as to why.  Their lack of involvement stems from their perception of political 
parties as ineffective or the corruption of the political system as a whole.  They claim that the 
148 Zakaria, “Constitutional Liberalism,” 6. 
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political party system was either inefficient or corrupt and saw no benefit in participating.  
Ibrahim says that he does not like political parties because they do not have the power to change 
anything: 
Nothing will change if I join them. They don’t make a difference. They [Egyptian 
government] will do what they want and nothing will change that. 
 
Similarly, Saad explains that Egyptian political parties are “all corrupt and ineffective” and that 
he does not vote because “the ballot boxes are already full.”  He is implying that the elections in 
Egypt are not free and fair and therefore, he has no motivation to participate in the election 
process.  Mohammed also mentions government corruption, “If you have lots of money, you can 
buy your way into Parliamentary seats.”  The Egyptian National Assembly is seen as a corrupt 
body that facilitates bribery.   
 Another respondent makes a significant point regarding the high personal cost of voting 
and the lack of benefits associated with it: 
He also says that the government makes it too difficult to vote. You have to stand in line 
for hours in the heat...and then the outcome may not be counted right. So it’s generally a 
waste of time. 
 
All of these respondents feel that political participation will not change the situation in Egypt and 
are therefore apathetic to the entire process.  Their statements support the hypothesis that 
Egyptian political culture, even among the educated elite, is largely apathetic and uninterested in 
political participation.  The apathy is conditioned by years of corruption, lack of accountability 
and obstacles to meaningful political participation.   
 An apathetic and disinterested individual lacks a sense of empowerment required for 
political participation.  The perception that they do not have the ability to change anything 
because their vote will not count creates a situation in which the citizens do not expect much from 
the government.  The government is seen as corrupt with no accountability or transparency in the 
political process.  Without free and fair elections, voting is considered irrelevant and ineffective. 
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 Additionally, two participants alluded to the idea that the poor economic situation in 
Egypt causes its citizens to be concerned with survival rather than political participation: 
The Egyptian government makes the people worry about food and survival so that they 
forget about the political process. They must eat before they can think about democracy. 
 
The first respondent makes a very sobering claim about the Egyptian government.  He claims that 
the regime benefits from the poor economic state of its citizens who are too concerned with daily 
survival to ask for more rights.   
Sixty percent of the population in Egypt is still illiterate and worried about surviving. 
They are too poor to think about the political process…The two main problems in Egypt 
are education and economic level. When those improve maybe we can think about 
democracy. 
 
The fact that the majority of Egyptians are still concerned about meeting their basic survival 
needs suggests that the standard of living is not at a high enough for an interest in political 
participation.  The high rate of illiteracy and lack of an adequate education create even more 
obstacles for a viable democracy.  When people are well-educated with opportunities to obtain 
adequate employment they will no longer be concerned with survival.  The emergence of a large 
middle class in Egypt would cause a greater demand for additional rights including greater 
political participation and meaningful elections. 
 The general acceptance of the status quo has a very negative effect on the prospects for 
democracy in Egypt.  It widely known that the Egyptian government does not abide by the rule of 
law.  The lack of faith in government leaders to abide by the law causes the regime to lose its 
legitimacy in the eyes of its citizenry.  There is a crisis of national leadership when citizens 
cannot look to their government as the example of how to abide by the rule of law.  If citizens 
choose to emulate the actions of their government or follow its example, they too, will engage in 
corruption and acts of bribery.  Those who choose to follow the strict rule of law for fear of 
consequences of the strong state will feel completely disassociated from their government.  Law-
abiding citizens, who see that those in the government are above the law, will be feel resentment 
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and frustration.  Anger about injustices combined with the feelings of powerlessness means that 
citizens are more susceptible to the lure of extremist ideologies, which often advocate the 
overthrow of the regime because it is seen as immoral. 
 The next open-ended question asked each respondent to describe their attitude towards 
about the United States.  The interviewer gave the respondents the opportunity to give examples 
to support their view.  Are their feelings based on values, the media, or U.S. policies?  A pattern 
found in all but one case is that perceptions of the U.S. government and its policies are 
overwhelmingly negative. The general consensus is that the U.S. government and its intentions in 
the region cannot be trusted especially because of hypocritical American policies. 
 Four respondents cite what they perceive as hypocritical or contradictory U.S. policies as 
reasons for their mistrust.  Mohammed says that the U.S. policies “say one thing and do another” 
and that Americans leaders are “allies with dictators and topple their regime.”  He argues that the 
U.S. has “no shame” in changing its policies “even in front of the whole world.”  Blatant 
contradictions in U.S. policy are seen as arrogant and show a lack of integrity on the part of U.S. 
government leaders. 
 Three respondents mention that the U.S. government has been friendly with dictators, 
including Saddam Hussein, only to later enact policies against them.  Saad’s comments serve as 
an example this view:  
They [U.S. government] say that they want to get rid of Saddam Hussein but they used to 
be friends with him. He used to be their playboy. 
 
Another respondent mentions how the U.S. supplied him with weapons and technology during the 
Iran-Iraq war.  Another mentions the concept of hypocrisy when discussing the subject of 
terrorism.  He claims that the U.S. labels everything as terrorism while it commits acts of 
terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan.  He thinks that U.S. terrorism is “worse because it’s 
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international terrorism.” Another respondent mentions several U.S. explanations for going to war 
in Iraq by saying: 
Bush said first that the reason he is invading Iraq is for weapons of mass destruction. 
Now that they can’t find any, he claims it is for democracy.    
 
The sense of mistrust felt by the respondents is a result of perceived hypocritical U.S. policies 
used to prove that they should also not be trusted in the future. 
 One very important theme is the affect of the Arab-Israeli conflict on perceptions.  Many 
of the respondents perceive U.S. policies toward the conflict as biased towards Israel.  U.S. 
support for Israel is consistently repeated throughout many of the interviews as a reason not to 
trust the U.S.  This is seen as another aspect of U.S. injustice and hypocrisy.   
 Two respondents mention identical points when discussing hypocritical U.S. policies 
regarding Israel and nuclear weapons.  One explains how the U.S. prevents countries like Libya 
from producing nuclear weapons and allows Israel to have them.  The same reference to injustice 
is expressed by another respondent who explains favorable treatment of Israel with regards to 
nuclear weapons.  He asks why the U.S. considers it acceptable for Israel to have nuclear weapon 
capability and not for Libya and Iraq.  Clearly, they perceive the difference in U.S. policy as 
unjust with favoritism towards Israel compared to other Arab countries.   
 Yet another respondent explains America’s unequal treatment of its allies, Israel and 
Egypt, saying, “U.S. gives the most military aid to Israel and the leftover, old-fashioned 
technology to Egypt.”  This perception is that the U.S. purposely makes Israel stronger in relation 
to Egypt.  The idea is that because it is an Arab country, Egypt cannot be a true ally of the U.S. 
like Israel.  Aid is not considered a U.S. effort to sincerely help Egypt, but to maintain the 
strength of Israel in relation to it.  The fact that they see U.S. aid as an arm of exploitation shows 
the level of mistrust they feel towards the U.S.  An act by the U.S. that may be considered a help 
to Egypt, is seen as a means to control and subjugate Egypt to its will. 
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 Other respondents express their frustration about what they perceive as differential 
treatment of Israel and injustice towards the Palestinians.  One respondent explains this by 
explaining a situation in which President George W. Bush endorses Palestinian rights disapproves 
of Israel’s actions with Egypt’s President Mubarak.  He claims that only two hours later, Bush 
then gives the Israeli President approval to do “anything else they wanted with a guarantee that no 
one will stand in their way.”  This depiction aims to show the level of hypocrisy of the U.S. 
government and particularly that of President Bush, as one that is outwardly hypocritical and 
purposely deceptive.  The U.S. support for Palestinian rights is seen as a blatant lie told by Bush 
only to appease Mubarak, ultimately showing a lack of respect for the Egyptian President.  This 
also shows the respondent’s perception of Bush as lacking honesty and integrity.   
 One respondent says that democratization will not be possible as long as the Arab-Israeli 
conflict continues because, “The U.S. has no credibility.”  Another respondent says that America 
does not represent democratic ideals because, “it’s all about supporting the Israelis.” Since the 
U.S. supports Israel to be an unjust occupying force over the Palestinians, it cannot possibly a 
credible promoter of democracy.  If the U.S. stood for democracy, the argument goes; it would 
sincerely support the rights of the Palestinians and curb the undemocratic occupation of Israel.  
The lack of support for democracy for the Palestinians, therefore, is thought to be an anti-Arab, 
pro-Western stance to exploit the Middle East.  Consequently, the U.S. is seen as representing 
values of a neo-colonialist power seeking global hegemony, which inherently contradicts the 
promotion of democratic ideals. 
 The perception of injustices related to the Arab-Israeli conflict has a great deal of 
influence on their opinions of the U.S. as well as their general worldview.  One respondent says 
that he does not have a problem with Jewish people, but with Israeli President Sharon, 
“controlling land and people” through the occupation of the Palestinian territories and claims that 
this is the “number one reason for terrorism.”  Another describes another aspect of injustice 
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relating to Western media coverage by saying, “One Israeli gets killed and it’s shown all over the 
place [in the media]. One-hundred Palestinians get killed and no one shows anything.”  He claims 
that this injustice and unequal treatment creates hate.   
 Two respondents specifically make references to the suffering of Palestinians that they 
have seen in the media.  One says that “Palestinian women are shown crying on television 
because their house is destroyed.”  The other mentions violence shown in the media by saying, 
“Sharon, Bush, I hate them. The boy that got shot in his father’s arms in Palestine, do you 
remember that?”   They are faced with what they perceive as injustice and feel as though they do 
not have the ability to change the situation.  Their government is seen as ineffective in stopping 
the suffering of the Palestinians and has repeatedly failed to do so even after many wars with 
Israel and extensive diplomatic peace efforts. 
 The anger and frustration that they feel regarding the tragic situation of the Palestinians is 
fueled by media images that show their suffering.  They see the conflict as a symbol of Western 
domination and exploitation of Arabs.  The failure of the Arab regimes to counter the neo-
colonialism renders them incapable of protecting Arabs against the many years of humiliation of 
a historically great people.  They cannot rely on their government to change this situation and 
lack the ability to elect new government leaders.  They are forced to accept the injustice they 
repeatedly see on their televisions every night while feeling powerless to change anything. 
 A related theme throughout many interviews is the reference the relationship between the 
U.S. and Jewish people.  One respondent believes that, “Americans and Jews are full of 
corruption.”  The common perception is that the U.S. is so heavily influenced by the Jewish-
American community that they have the ability to control the media.  They use the media to 
influence both U.S. citizens and their politicians in power to be anti-Arab and anti-Islam.  They 
see America as hijacked by the Jewish community in order to brainwash the American citizenry 
and create policies against the Arabs.  There is a sense that the respondents see Israel is so 
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powerful that it can manipulate to U.S. government to enact policies against the interests of the 
Middle East.   
 All six respondents have made numerous references to the idea of the powerful Jewish 
communities both in the U.S. and Israel, representing a normative theme of helplessness or 
vulnerability perceiving Arabs as victims.  The general consensus among these respondents is that 
Jewish people around the world are so powerful that they have the ability to control the world to 
target Arabs.  This suggests that religion plays a more important role in influencing their 
perceptions than they may like to admit.  For example, the respondent who claims that religion 
does not affect his attitude; he later says “Jewish people run the media in the U.S.”  Another 
respondent claims that, “We [Muslims] have no problem with Jews” and later contradicts this by 
saying that the Jewish lobby in the U.S. is, “all about their interests.”  They seem extremely 
concerned about the power of Jewish people in the U.S. to negatively influence policies to target 
the Middle East.    
 The opinions of six of the respondents toward President Bush are also decidedly negative. 
Two of the respondents refer to him as an “international terrorist” while two others say that he is 
the reason that they dislike the U.S. government even more than they already had.  Another 
respondent says that Bush “does not negotiate or discuss” increasing terrorism because “the U.S. 
has taught the Arabs that the only way to get their attention is to use violence.”  This respondent 
claims that because that the U.S. only responds to violence and that President Bush does not 
engage in diplomacy.  The perception is that the U.S. will not take notice of Arab concerns unless 
violence or terrorism is used to force Americans to take notice.  This is a dangerous idea for the 
U.S. as it attempts to fight global terrorism and prevent violence on American soil.   
 After each interview, four respondents expressed great concern about the possibility that 
President Bush be re-elected the in the following U.S. election in November.   They were 
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genuinely worried about the prospect of him getting elected, which means that they consider his 
reelection as having a direct negative bearing on their lives.   
 Six of the seven respondents express positive opinions of either America or its people.  
They have disassociated their negative opinions of the U.S. government and its policies from their 
perception of the American people and the country as a whole.  For example, one respondent who 
had referred to U.S. action in Afghanistan as “international terrorism” later says, “My attitude 
towards the people [American citizens] is great. I love them and respect them.”  Another 
respondent says that U.S. policies are full of “selfishness, greed, and control” and later saying, “I 
like to visit American and go there often to vacation. The country itself has a lot to offer.”  While 
criticizing the U.S. government during the interview, two respondents briefly mention after the 
interview that they are awaiting a visa to immigrate to America. 
 One main reason they are able to separate their opinion the U.S. government from that of 
the American people is due to their own experience with government.  Since they feel that their 
own government is not representative of their core values, they are largely disassociated with it.  
This makes it easy for them to envision the American people’s beliefs as largely disassociated 
with that of the U.S government. 
 There is yet another more obvious reason that accounts for their ability to separate their 
feelings about the U.S. government from the American people; the belief American people are 
ignorant because they are controlled by a biased media.  Four of the respondents of the 
respondents feel that Americans are not informed of the “truth” because the media is controlled 
by the Jewish population in the U.S.  One respondent clearly states this by saying: 
What CNN shows Americans is not true. I don’t blame American people, they don’t 
know the truth.  The Jewish people run the media in the U.S. 
 
Another respondent mentions almost an identical point, “They [American citizens] don’t know 
the reality because the media in the U.S. is controlled by people who do not deliver the truth” and 
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later explained the power of the Jewish lobby.  Yet another respondent claims the U.S. is not 
democratic, “It’s like apartheid because the Jews rule all.”  By blaming Jewish-Americans for 
controlling the minds of the American people through the media, they are able to disassociate 
their negative opinions of the U.S. government from their positive view of the American people.   
Another respondent says, “The American people cannot be blamed for the injustices their 
government causes.”   Overall they see the American people as uninformed and ignorant because 
they are victims of Jewish domination.   
 One of the most obvious patterns found throughout all but one interview, is the belief that 
the motivation for the U.S. invasion of Iraq was based on a quest for oil.  The one respondent who 
claims that the U.S. motivation was not for oil still expresses doubt about the sincerity of the 
democratization policy, “Bush pretends to care for them [Arabs] so that he can control them and 
bring them closer.”  The other six respondents claim that the U.S. invaded Iraq to acquire its oil 
or control the Middle East either militarily or economically.  Some of the responses are 
summarized below: 
They [the US] invaded Iraq for oil and to help reconstruction companies. Dick Cheney 
[U.S. Vice President] helped Halliburton, his old company. 
 
He [President Bush] went to Iraq for oil and to put more military bases in the Middle East 
in order to control it. 
 
They [U.S. government] want control of Iraqi oil and more military bases throughout the 
Middle East. 
 
It is clear that all of the respondents perceive that the U.S. invasion of Iraq to be motivated by 
reasons other than democracy promotion.  Not one single respondent expressed the belief that the 
U.S. policy in Iraq was to create a democratic state. 
 These same six respondents believe that the Bush Administration should not be trusted.  
Every single respondent expresses skepticism about the Bush administration’s policy of 
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democratization in the Middle East by explaining it at a facade used to hide other hidden goals.  
The following statements show the level of mistrust directly felt toward President Bush: 
Bush talks about democracy to justify what he is doing.  Is it being done for our [Arabs] 
good? No. 
 
Bush said first that he reason he is invading Iraq is for weapons of mass destruction. Now 
that they can’t find any, he claims it is for democracy. 
 
 He’s [Bush] a liar. He doesn’t want democracy. 
 
He [Bush] says that but its only words… He put forth this policy because he thinks they 
[citizens of the Middle East] are stupid.  He tells them that they need it and pretends that 
he is helping them.  But really he’s trying to fool them, tricking them.  He actually wants 
to control the Middle East. He won’t be able to do that without talking about other goals. 
 
There is an obvious consensus that The Greater Middle East Initiative is a policy that has been 
enacted to achieve goals other than democratization.  They do not trust President Bush or his 
democratization policy in the Middle East.  
 All seven respondents describe the chaotic situation and lack of democracy in Iraq is used 
to refute the U.S. intentions for democratization.  The lack of freedoms in Iraq after the U.S. 
invasion is considered proof that the intent was completely unrelated to democracy.  They believe 
that because of the increasingly violent situation in Iraq, the U.S. never intended to promote a 
democracy at all: 
Where is the democracy? Ayad Al Elaway who worked in the FBI, CIA in America, was 
picked by the U.S. and says the same things as Saddam when he came to power, ‘We will 
destroy anyone in our way!’ 
Another respondent points to the Abu Ghraib prison scandal as a reason for skepticism about 
democracy.  This refers to the worldwide broadcast of several American soldiers physically 
abusing Iraqi prisoners and sexually humiliating them.  This brought worldwide attention to 
American treatment of Iraqis during the war:   
If they [U.S.] wanted democracy, they [U.S. soldiers] wouldn’t have done that to the 
prisoners [Abu Ghraib prison abuse]. 
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These respondents do not see any signs of democracy taking hold in the country and focus on 
issues of Iraqi violence and occupation.  All the respondents agree that that the U.S. invaded Iraq 
and proclaimed it as a democratization policy in order to achieve economic and political aims for 
its own benefit.  The invasion of Iraq is seen as a part of the U.S. imperialist strategy to control 
the region with Israel at the Arabs’ expense. 
 All seven respondents also felt that the U.S. war in Iraq would cause terrorism to 
increase.  Examples of the current Iraqi situation are used as evidence for the claims that there 
will be less democracy and more terrorism in Iraq.  One respondent gives explanations for 
terrorism saying that it “stems from poverty and hopelessness” and that the U.S. is not 
“encouraging prosperity” in Iraq, but rather is “actually making the situation worse.”   Similarly, 
another respondent says, “If there was democracy and the Iraqi people could say their opinions, 
there wouldn’t be any terrorism.”  They are clearly pessimistic about the American mission in 
Iraq believing that a democracy will not be established.  They provide reasons for terrorism as a 
justification and claim that the U.S. is exacerbating the problem as an occupying force in Iraq. 
 Another pattern among three of the respondents interviewed questioned whether the 
September 11th terrorist attacks were committed by Arabs with each citing specific examples to 
support their argument.  The first gave two reasons to support the idea that Jews were behind the 
terrorist attacks in the U.S. The first was the idea that all the Jewish people that worked in the 
World Trade Center did not attend work the day of the terrorist bombing attacks and, therefore, 
must have known about what was to happen ahead of time, “The Jews were not killed in the Twin 
Towers. They left the day before and took that day off work.”  This statement shows that the 
respondent’s negative perception of Jewish people because of the great lengths they will go in 
order to reach a goal.  The second reason given by this respondent was the only way that pictures 
would have been taken of the World Trade Center is if those taking the pictures knew that the 
attacks were going to take place.  The following statement clearly illustrates this point: 
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How did they take so many pictures of all the angles of the building [during the terrorist 
attacks]? They were ready to take the pictures. 
 
He believes that the pictures taken of the buildings prove that someone knew ahead of time about 
the attacks.  This respondent clearly articulates the fact that he believes that Jewish people played 
a role in these attacks.  He explains the possibility that the Muslim extremist, Osama Bin Laden, 
may have actually carried out the attacks but did so only through the help of U.S. and the Jews by 
saying, “maybe the Arabs, maybe Bin Laden, but who makes them do it? The CIA, the U.S., the 
Jews.”  This respondent seems to be trying to find any reason to place the blame on U.S.-Jewish 
conspiracy.  It should be noted that this respondent is Coptic Christian, not Muslim, and is 
therefore not protecting Islam from blame. 
 Another respondent attempts to use history as evidence for his claims about Jewish 
involvement in the September 11th terrorist attacks by claiming that in the past, Jews have often 
killed for a political goal, “The Messianic Jews have done it many times.”  He claims that Jews 
were responsible for the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand before World War I for political 
goals.  Since this assassination was the event to trigger the start of the war, he is in effect, 
blaming the Jews for the start of World War I. His explanation of the present U.S.-Jewish 
conspiracy is described as follows,  
They are willing to even destroy something they own in order to generate reaction against 
their enemies to achieve a certain goal. September 11th allowed the U.S. to react against 
the Arabs for their own benefit. 
 
Since post-September 11th policies are perceived as targeting Arabs, the U.S.-Jewish conspiracy 
must have motivated it.  The ultimate goal of this U.S.-Jewish conspiracy is to justify future anti-
Arab policies.  This is based on a zero-sum theory; the Jewish-American gain is an Arab loss.  
Therefore by enacting policies that hurt Arabs, the U.S. and Israel will ultimately benefit from 
this loss. 
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 The third respondent to express skepticism about Arab involvement in the September 11th 
terrorist attacks uses yet another idea as evidence.  He claims that the operation is too 
sophisticated to be conducted by Arabs, saying, “They do not have the expertise and the brains to 
conduct such as sophisticated operation.”  He claims that Arabs, “strap bombs and blow 
themselves up” and that they do not have enough “technology to fly planes and navigate it this 
way.”  Based on this he concludes that the attacks must have been a conspiracy between the CIA 
or FBI with “the Jews from Israel, of course.”  This conspiracy was in order to give the U.S. a 
reason “to change its foreign policy from supporting the Arab regimes like Saudi Arabia.”  Like 
the previous respondent, this respondent also believes that the ultimate goal of the U.S.-Jewish 
conspiracy is to ally against the Arabs.  
 There are many reasons that may account for their skepticism.  The first is the high level 
of mistrust of the U.S. and Israel with the expectation that their goal is to target Arabs.  These 
respondents feel that the U.S. and Israel would stage a large-scale terrorist operation in order to 
enact anti-Arab policies.  They believe that the U.S.-Jewish conspiracy considers Arabs as their 
enemy and aims to frame them so that they would have an excuse to make Arabs suffer.   
The second is a notion of self-defense. They would rather place the blame on another group than 
to admit that the terrorists were Arabs from their part of the world.  By deflecting the blame, they 
avoid addressing the idea that members from their own culture are violent extremists who are 
capable of causing the deaths of so many innocent people.  Denial of the problem allows for 
complete avoidance of the situation.  This perspective sees such large-scale terrorism as foreign 
to their people and more closely associated with the Americans or Jewish. 
 The third is their self perception about their people.  They see Arabs as incapable of 
conducting a large-scale sophisticated operation that flies American airplanes into skyscrapers.  
The respondent is clearly saying that his own people are too simple-minded and technologically 
incompetent to be responsible for the attacks.  The only agents capable of such an intricate and 
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evil operation, as the argument goes, are the Americans and Israelis.  This implies that Arabs are 
incompetent while Americans and Jews are quiet capable.  
 Yet another respondent described President Bill Clinton’s affair with Monica Lewinsky 
through the lens of a Jewish conspiracy to control of the U.S.  He claimed that the reason behind 
her public confession was politically related to Israel.  Because she was Jewish, his argument 
continued, she plotted against the President to prevent him from pressuring Israel. He uses the 
material evidence for the extra-marital affair in order to support his argument, saying “Why 
would she [Monica Lewinsky] hold on to that dress for three to four years?”  This respondent is 
convinced that the reason for her public statement was because she is Jewish.  His general 
viewpoint is that the Jewish community in the U.S. almost impeached President Clinton in order 
to protect Israel.  This is clearly evident when he states, “Clinton was almost ousted because Jews 
didn’t want pressure [from the U.S. government] on Israel.”  This respondent sees Clinton’s 
personal scandal within the framework of Jewish domination.  Jews are understood to be the 
cause of every conflict for Israel’s benefit.   
 Another conspiracy was briefly mentioned by a fifth respondent concerning President 
George H. Bush.  This respondent claimed that the President received millions of dollars from 
Kuwait for invading Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War.  This view is related to the argument often used 
to describe U.S. involvement in the second Gulf War; that the U.S. acts militarily for an economic 
benefit.  Based on this perception, U.S. policies cannot be trusted because their intentions are may 
be based on hidden economic reasons.  This respondent also shows underlying feelings of 
mistrust that shape his perception about the U.S. 
 Another reason to account for the prevalence of conspiracy theories is the lack of 
information reaching Egyptian citizens.  Without substantial facts and valid explanations of 
reality, people will often create theories to explain the world.  Theories will stem from their 
feelings and emotions without any real evidence for their claims.  Hazem Saghiya is an Arab 
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intellectual who accurately describes the cause for widespread conspiracy theories in Egypt.  He 
says that the Egyptian Ministry of Information and national press prevent competing ideas often 
by taking drastic measures such as shutting down independent journals all together.  He considers 
this the main cause of conspiracy theories, “when the facts do not reach [the public], rumors, 
exaggerations, fantasies, and fears develop” and that “the regression in the role [of people in 
society] increases paranoia, rather than stimulating minds to think independently and freely.”149  
Conspiracy theories are more likely to develop in an environment that does not promote a variety 
of ideas and discourages all criticism of the status quo.  A free flow of information is required to 
encourage critical thinking and tolerance of competing views. 
 
Comparison with Public Opinion Surveys 
 The general political attitudes of the educated Alexandrians are consistent with those of 
the general mass population in Egypt.  The views expressed by six of the seven respondents are 
similar to the answers in Shibley Telhami’s 2003 survey.  It showed that 13 percent of Egyptians 
surveyed had a favorable opinion (2 percent very favorable and 8 percent somewhat favorable) of 
the U.S. and 79 percent (58 percent very unfavorable and 20 percent somewhat unfavorable) 
showing an unfavorable view.150  Similarly, the data collected from the interviews shows that 
only one respondent showed a favorable view of the U.S. The other six expressed a negative view 
of the U.S. government and its policies.  Three of these six respondents, however, separated their 
negative view of the U.S. government from their positive view of the American people.  By 
making this distinction, they would fall into the category of “somewhat unfavorable” views of the 
U.S.  
149 Hazen Saghiya, Al-Hayat, (London-Beirut), 29 July 2001. 
150 Shibley, “Survey in Five Countries,” 2003. 
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 The survey also showed that almost half (46 percent) of Egyptians said that they based 
their attitude toward the U.S. on its policy in the Middle East.  Overall the majority of 
respondents cited U.S. policies as reasons for their negative attitude toward the U.S. government 
including support for Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict, past hypocritical policies, and the 
occupation of Iraq.  The perception of American policies in the region played the central role in 
each of these respondents’ negative perceptions.  The survey also found that the remaining 43 
percent of Egyptians based their negative attitude on their values.  One respondent’s positive 
view of the U.S. was certainly influenced by personal values related to Christianity.  Three other 
respondents while emphasizing flawed U.S. policies also say that a U.S.-style democracy is 
incompatible with their core religious beliefs.  It is not entirely clear which one of these 
categories they would belong to.  
 A third obvious similarity lies in the issue concerning U.S. intentions in Iraq.  The survey 
showed that 77 percent of Egyptians surveyed felt that U.S. policy in Iraq was motivated by oil.151  
Once again, this is comparable to the answers given by the educated Egyptians interviewed in the 
qualitative study.  The overwhelming majority of those interviewed (six of the seven) also 
mentioned oil as a main reason behind the U.S. invasion of Iraq.  The survey showed that 66 
percent of surveyed Egyptians named Israel as an important reason for the American policy in 
Iraq.152  During the many of the interviews, the issue of U.S. support of Israel was also frequently 
mentioned as a motivation factor for U.S. actions in the region. 
 Yet a fourth similarity can be found in the perceptions about the prospects for democracy.  
Telhami’s survey concludes that only 6 percent of the masses in Egypt felt that the war in Iraq 
would bring more democracy and the majority (63 percent) saying that it would not.153  Every 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 
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single Egyptian respondent interviewed expressed pessimism about democracy in Iraq as well as 
the rest of the Middle East.  All seven individuals share similar perceptions as the great majority 
of those surveyed expecting less democracy as outcome of the Iraqi war. 
 The results of the qualitative study converge considerably with those found one year 
earlier using a quantitative survey method.  The great majority of these educated Alexandrians 
have similar perceptions as the mass population in Cairo.  Neither education level nor residence 
in a historically liberal city caused them to have different interpretations of U.S. democratization 
policy.  This indicates that there is considerable agreement that U.S. policies cannot be taken at 
face-value and are generally viewed with skepticism.  
 
Summary of Findings 
 Over forty years ago, Leonard Binder described the political culture of the Egyptian 
educated class as accepting the notion that they “cannot relate to the government, cannot change 
anything, there is only one policy, and everyone must confirm to that policy”.154  The same 
statement can still be applied today to describe the perspective of the seven participants in this 
study.  The great majority of respondents showed a great deal of apathy regarding political 
participation in political parties or the election process.  For the most part, they are disassociated 
from their government leaders and entire political process as a whole.  Political parties are seen as 
ineffective and corrupt bodies made up of members that are self-interested.  Elections are viewed 
as futile because of widespread government corruption preventing a free and fair outcome. 
 There remains a large gap between the Egyptian regime and its citizens with very little 
meaningful dialogue between the two.  Egyptians are generally uninformed about the country’s 
political decision-making as well as their individual rights.  It is accepted that the government is 
154 Binder, 402. 
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unrepresentative personal interests and unresponsive to daily needs.  Consequently, Egyptian 
people have minimal expectations of governmental output and fail to exert pressure on their 
leaders to provide more.  
 The Nasser’s tactic of distracting citizens with injustices beyond Egypt’s borders is also 
still evident today in Mubarak’s Egypt.  Using a more subtle approach, Mubarak maintains the 
same strategy by allowing citizens to focus on the injustice of Western dominance, in effect, 
deferring blame.  The Egyptian national press (and Arab news channels) continuously emphasizes 
the suffering of Palestinians because of the brutal Israeli occupation backed by the U.S.  The 
Arab-Israeli conflict has continued to be seen as the symbol for Western neo-colonialism and the 
exploitation of Arabs and Muslims.  Egyptians are inundated daily with images that show what 
they see as repeated injustices against Palestinians and Iraqis.  The constant reminder of the 
humiliation of Arab peoples is compounded with a sense of powerlessness.  Citizens are aware 
that they do not have the power to change anything or solve injustices against Arabs and 
especially the Palestinians.  Nor can they rely on their government, which has repeatedly failed to 
defend Arab interests against Israel and the U.S.  The feelings of vulnerability and helplessness as 
well as anger and resentment fuel a perception nearly obsessed with the victimization of Arabs by 
an all-powerful U.S.-Israel alliance.  These respondents illustrate the depth of this perception as it 
becomes an all-encompassing worldview. 
 The worldview maintains that the U.S. and Israel dominate the world and exploit the 
Arab world in particular.  They see Arabs as constantly victimized in relation to the U.S.-Israel 
alliance as self-interested, violent aggressors.  This worldview is partially the reason some believe 
that it is unlikely that Arabs were the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  
Lack of information in the repressed Egyptian society also contributes to the formulation of 
alternative stories and explanations of reality. 
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 Six of the seven respondents (one Coptic Christian and five Muslims) cite various 
examples to describe what they see as injustice.  The consensus is that U.S. policies are 
hypocritical and show unequal treatment of others with U.S. government leaders seen as 
dishonest and unethical.  One respondent plainly explains that America no longer stands for 
democratic ideals and no longer be trusted.   The idea is that if the U.S. is calling for democratic 
ideals, the actions of their representatives would be reflective of those principles.  This unequal 
treatment is presented with the normative consideration that it is unjust. 
 The lack of trust in the U.S. is shown repetitively throughout six of the seven interviews.  
Reasons behind these feelings of mistrust are examples of U.S. policies, especially those related 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Since Israel is considered an enemy, the close U.S.-Israeli 
relationship is considered evidence that the U.S. is also an enemy.  Since both their interests are 
so closely aligned, the hatred for the Arabs must also be shared, and therefore, neither country 
should be trusted by Middle Easterners.  Any attempts by the U.S. to assist Arabs should be 
cautiously viewed with suspicion.  They see America’s first priority as protecting and maintaining 
relations with Israel, even at the detriment of all Arab peoples in the Middle East.  As an enemy 
of Middle Easterners, U.S. policies toward the region will always aim to exploit Arabs for U.S.-
Israeli interests.  It is this framework that effects all other interpretations and meanings of the 
U.S. and its policies. 
 Viewed from this perspective, the second U.S. invasion of Iraq is also an attempt to serve 
U.S. interests at the expense of those in the region.  While the U.S. explains the reasons to go to 
war as motivated by promoting democracy and liberating the Iraqi people, these respondents see 
ulterior motives.  All of the respondents viewed the war as motivated by a U.S. quest for Iraqi oil 
or for control of the region.  They viewed the U.S. as self-interested with no intentions of 
promoting democracy to help the Iraqis.  Democratization, outlined by The Greater Middle East 
Initiative, is seen as a guise to meddle in the domestic affairs of Arab countries and to allow the 
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U.S. to have more power over the Arab peoples and their resources.  Therefore, democratization 
is not expected to be successful in Iraq or throughout the region. 
 U.S. justification for the Greater Middle East Initiative will never be accepted by those 
who doubt Arab involvement for the attacks on September 11th.  By denying the existence of 
Arab violence towards the U.S., skeptics are able to challenge the motivations of democratization. 
They dispute the very foundations of the policy often making it unjustifiable.  The Greater 
Middle East Initiative is not seen as a policy to counter extremism in the Middle East, but one 
that is motivated by other hidden reasons.  Alternative interpretations to explain these motivations 
stem from the lack of trust in the U.S. as a neo-colonial power and the constant fear of 
exploitation and humiliation. 
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CHAPTER 5   CONCLUSION 
 
 
Implications for Democracy 
 
 These findings have various implications for the democratization process in Egypt.  
Using Sidney Verba’s framework of analysis, the four dimensions of political culture will be 
examined.  The first concerns the most basic issue of national identity.  The distinct ancient 
Egyptian history has led to a strong national consciousness of the people that consider themselves 
distinctly Egyptian.  Egyptian society is also the most ethnically and religiously homogeneous 
societies in the Middle East.  Therefore, there is a strong national identity in which Egyptians 
consider themselves members of the nation-state.  This is a positive sign for the prospects of 
democracy giving the national leaders the ability to mobilize its citizens as one cohesive 
citizenry.   
 The second dimension is an individual’s identification with fellow citizens.  A few 
respondents mention their concern that an election would allow Islamic groups to come to power. 
One respondent mentions his concern that if elections were held in Egypt, Islamists would win 
saying, “In Alexandria, they [Islamists] won all local elections in the past, before they were 
outlawed.  That’s what we’re afraid of.”  This respondent is weary of reforms that would allow 
Islamists to come to power causing what he perceives as even greater problems for Egypt. Others 
claim that Egyptians are illiterate or too poor to participate in the political process.  This shows a 
lack of confidence in other citizens and a low level of interpersonal trust.  There is little 
confidence in their fellow Egyptian citizens which is a missing characteristic of a tolerant society 
required for a successful transition to democracy. 
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 The third dimension relates to beliefs about governmental output.  All of the respondents 
have few expectations of the Egyptian government.  Most also admit that their government is 
corrupt and ineffective and accept the status quo without question.  Although they express dismay 
with the economic, educational, and societal ills of the country, they do not expect the 
government to change and provide more for them.  This is also detrimental for the prospects of 
democracy because of the minimal view of what the government ought to do for them.  They 
seem rather parochial because they expect to be satisfied from other institutions such as the 
family.  The lack of desirability for governmental activity places no demands on the government 
and has significant negative implications on the emergence of an effective political system. 
 The last dimension concerns beliefs about how the government makes decisions.  The 
respondents seem to know very little about how decisions are made.  They are generally 
disinterested in political parties and show no desire to learn.  The majority of the respondents 
does not see a need to be involved with a political party and are not active participants in the 
government.  They do not feel that they have a role in the political process. There is also a 
disagreement about what freedoms are granted in Egypt.  Two respondents claimed that they have 
freedom of speech in Egypt while two others say the exact opposite.  The lack of consensus about 
their freedoms shows that the respondents are distant and disassociated from political system. 
 
Future Research 
  Additional interviews with educated Egyptians would provide a larger sample and a 
richer variety of perspectives.   Interviews conducted on a greater scale with more participants 
allows for additional data that is most useful in identifying patterns and themes.  The greater 
number of respondents, the greater the chance that the perceptions exist in the general population.  
In addition, asking the same questions among the same educated elite in Alexandria, Egypt will 
show if perceptions have changed over time and why regarding issues pertaining to 
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democratization and the U.S. role in that process.  However, qualitative interviewing is costly and 
time consuming making it contingent on both time and resources available to the researcher.  
 Further qualitative research should continue to complement mass opinion surveys in the 
Middle East.  As shown in this study, the combination of both quantitative and qualitative 
methods in the study of political culture has many benefits.  Qualitative interviews using similar 
questions as mass surveys will continue to provide a more complete in-depth analysis of political 
culture and show the complexity of perspectives.  It also has the added value of either confirming 
data findings or pointing out divergent results, which can reflect error or bias in research 
instruments.155
 Another option involves an approach that analyzes other sub-groups within a society.  In 
Egypt, it would be significant to compare across various groups such as the rural and urban 
peasants, the governmental elites, and the wealthy upper class.  Examining the worldview of 
Egyptians from all sectors of society will show whether and how socio-economic level influences 
political attitudes.  There may either be a general consensus or sharp disagreement about the 
prospects for an Egyptian democracy.  Huge discrepancies among perceptions indicate greater 
obstacles to the democratization process in Egypt. 
 Future qualitative interviews in the region should also take a cross-national approach and 
compare perceptions of individuals from two or more countries.  Perceptions in Egypt, for 
example, compared with those in Morocco and Kuwait would provide insights from a country in 
each part of the greater Middle East; North Africa, the Middle East, and the Gulf.  The wide 
demographic range makes comparison even more valuable.  Do all respondents have the same 
opinions about U.S. democratization policy?  Perhaps they all identify themselves as Arabs with 
the same concerns.  On the other hand, there may be a sharp difference of perceptions of 
155 Hilary Arksey and Peter Knight eds., Interviewing for Social Scientists, (London: Sage Publications, 
1999), 28. 
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democratization, for example, because of their unique national histories.  This comparison would 
be highly useful in identifying whether participants identify with a pan-Arab cultural 
interpretation or a more nationalistic perception. 
 It is clear that additional qualitative research is conducted in the Middle East to further 
explain its political culture and perceptions that are vital to understanding the Arab world.  In an 
increasingly integrated world with the risks of global terrorism, it is imperative to conduct area 
studies in a region that is largely misunderstood by Westerners.  Personal narratives provide a 
deeper analysis of the Arab worldview and leads to a comprehensive understanding of their deep 
fears and threats.  This will help bridge the widening gap of perceptions between Middle 
Easterners and the West, ultimately contributing to the quest for a safer and more secure world 
order.
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APPENDIX A:  Interview Questions 
 
1. How do you define democracy? 
 
2. Are you part of an Egyptian political party?  Why or Why not? 
 
3. What is your attitude towards the United States?     
  
4. President Bush has proclaimed the ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ to democratize the 
Middle East from Morocco to Pakistan.  Why do you think this policy has been put forth? 
 Will it succeed?  Why or why not? 
 
5. The Bush Administration is seeking to begin democratization in the Middle East with the 
removal of Saddam Hussein. Will the U.S.-Iraq war mean more democracy or less 
democracy in the Middle East?  Why or Why not? 
 
6. The U.S. has been asking Egypt to ‘show the way’ for other Arab countries and lead 
democratic reform.  Do you welcome America’s call for democratic ideals in Egypt?  
Why or Why not?” 
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APPENDIX B:  Interview One Data 
 
 
Date of Interview: June 3, 2004 
Place of Interview: Luxor, Egypt (on a Nile Cruise Ship) 
Demographic information: 
Career:  Entrepreneur who owns many businesses including the development of a German 
school in Alexandria. 
Political Party:  None. 
Religion:  Muslim.   
Degree:  Graduated with Bachelors in Faculty of Commerce from Alexandria University. 
Residence:  Alexandria, Egypt 
Current Occupation:  Manager of a Nile Cruise. 
Age:  45 
Visited the U.S.: No 
Name:  “Ahmed” 
 
Q: How to you define “democracy”? 
A: Free speech. To say my opinion as I want. Accurate information needs to reach an individual.  
Today’s vision is not the same as 7,000 years ago [in Egypt]. We received zero votes for the 
World Cup.  When the judges came to the country [before the voting] to see what we had to offer 
the world for the soccer match, we showed them the pyramids. What have we done presently? We 
showed him accomplishments of the past.  And then he got mugged in our streets. Of course we 
didn’t get any votes.  Elections, to pick another choice. Someone who loves the country and who 
is capable. I travel a lot. And I see how people live. See how people live here. [as he points to the 
homes made out of clay]. His mannerisms show disgust and frustration. 
 
Q: What is your attitude towards the U.S.?  
A: I don’t like it. I have had a visa for five years and have never been there. Jewish people run it 
[U.S.] Many people say that the Jews were responsible for September 11th. To hurt the Arabs 
[image]. 70 million Egyptians and me are being choked [by America]. If the U.S. wants to come 
into Egypt with soldiers [invasion], I will be the first in the face against U.S. soldiers [points his 
index finger straight ahead].  I hate Bush. I even like Putin more than Bush. Bush is bloody. 
Becomes very aggressive and audibly louder. 
 
Q: What is this attitude based on?  
A: My feelings are based on their policies. Not because of religion. Religion doesn’t guide my 
thinking. It doesn’t matter what religion someone is. I have both Muslim and Christian friends as 
well as American friends. It doesn’t matter. 
 
Q: How long have you had this view? 
A: For a long time. At least for the last ten years. 
 
Q: President Bush has proclaimed the ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ to democratize the 
Middle East from Morocco to Palestine.  Why do you think this policy has been put forth? 
A: He’s a liar. He doesn’t want democracy. He wants to rule them in order to take their resources. 
Control their media.  Economically, politically control them. He wants resources, oil. Speaking 
very confidently, in a matter-of-fact way. 
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Q: Will democratization succeed? Why or why not? 
A: No, of course it won’t. He will try, but the people will resist. They must want it [for 
themselves]. 
 
Q: The Bush Administration is seeking to begin democratization in the Middle East with 
the removal of Saddam Hussein. Why do you think this policy has been put forth? 
A: Saddam is the only one I admire. He stood up to the U.S., the only one in the Arab world. He 
is strong. Not Mubarak, not the Saudis [stand up to the US]. When I saw the way he looked [on 
TV], I cried [when US captured Saddam].  I cried after he’s gone.  The only way they [US] took 
Baghdad is because they had a conspiracy with the guards, with money.  It was too easy. What is 
happening today?  They [U.S.] are getting beat up by loyalists [loyalists to Saddam]. U.S. went to 
Iraq for oil.  
 
Q: Will the war in Iraq mean more or less terrorism in the Middle East? Why or Why not? 
A: It [US invasion] will increase terrorism.  Look at Saudi Arabia today, where Americans are 
being killed by terrorism.  America is telling them to get out [of Saudi Arabia].  I even respect 
Bin Laden as well. The U.S. will not leave June 30. Going in the bathroom, isn’t like leaving. 
[Egyptian saying]. If they wanted democracy, they [U.S. soldiers] won’t have done that to the 
prisoners [Abu Ghraib]. It was not just a few soldiers it was politics. A general policy of the US. 
That’s why Rumsfeld is not fired.  What CNN shows Americans is not true. I don’t blame 
American people, they don’t know the truth. The Jewish people run the media in the US. US 
doesn’t really want democracy [seems very serious and intense]. 
 
Q: The U.S. has been asking Egypt to ‘show the way’ for other Arab countries and lead 
democratic reform. Do you welcome America’s call for democratic ideals in Egypt? Why or 
why not? 
A:  American democracy is not for Arabs. Even in the U.S., Arabs are not able to form groups 
because they will be deported or given problems.  I do not welcome the U.S. because I don’t trust 
them.  Not 1 [person] out of the 70 million [in Egypt] or President Mubarak can trust Bush. If 
Mubarak goes to the US to talk to Bush its only to protect Egypt from the U.S., not because he 
trusts them [the US].  The problem is not just Bush; it’s the US government in general.  Bush says 
he’s fighting terrorism, but he is the terrorist of the whole world, an international terrorist.  We 
[Egyptians] leave Egypt because we are afraid of what will happen to Egypt. I have two kids, a 
boy and a girl. I am afraid of what will happen to them. Not from Egypt, but from who will 
invade. We are already occupied financially and politically. They [the U.S.] make Israel stronger 
and us [Egypt] weaker, so that they [the US and Israel] will invade, just like the 1967 Six Day 
War. The U.S. will invade, just like the Koran says.  The U.S. gives the most military aid to Israel 
and the leftover, old-fashioned technology to Egypt.  Be sure that the 70 million [Egyptians], who 
are not able to eat, will hold weapons [during a military invasion]. Sharon, Bush, I hate them.  
The boy that got shot in his father’s arms in Palestine, do you remember that?”  
(Yes)  
Do you think CNN showed that [in America]? [Implying that it was not shown.]  The 30 milliare 
debt everybody [in Egypt] shares. All Egyptians who have left Egypt and gone to the U.S., keep 
their money there.  They don’t give it back to Egypt because they are afraid of the external 
control over them.  The Egyptian government makes the people worry about food and survival so 
that they forget about the political process. They must eat before they can think about democracy. 
At the end of the interview, he warns the interviewer about the dangers of interviewing in Egypt.  
He says that if someone wanted to have the interviewer arrested, they could easily do so by telling 
the government about the interviews. 
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APPENDIX C:  Interview Two Data 
 
 
Date of Interview:  July, 27 2004 
Place of Interview:  The American Center in Alexandria, Egypt 
Demographic information: 
Career: Attorney.  
Political Party: National Democratic Party.  
Religion: Muslim.   
Degree: Bachelors in Political Science from Alexandria University. 
Residence: Alexandria, Egypt 
Current Occupation: Journalist for an Egyptian newspaper. 
Age: 30 
Visited the U.S. No 
Name: Said 
 
Q: How to you define “democracy”? 
A: When the government does not have control over its citizens. When citizens can say their 
honest opinion. When I have the right for a good quality of life.  There is equal opportunity and 
where opportunities are available.  Elections, with the right to vote for Congress and the 
President.  Today in Egypt, newspapers can write anything.  The law which allowed for their 
arrest is now gone. All people [in Egypt] can say what they want. Gara-im El Ri’ya, which is 
freedom of speech.  Montesquieu says that the issue is not the approach the government takes, 
rather the most important issue is how a leader deals in matters. Accountability. That they 
[government leaders] can’t do corrupt things, like change elections. Even if there are many 
choices for people, there can still be corruption.  It’s not the way you elect people, it’s the 
outcome and transparency’ [of the election process]. 
 
Q: Are you a part of an Egyptian political party? Why or Why not? 
A: Yes, I am. I am a member of the Hiyzb El Watany [Mubarak’s ruling political party].  I want 
to help my country improve for the future. My opinion is that in the future, Egypt will have a big 
role. There have been a lot of good changes. Last government Ministers [members of Egyptian 
Parliament] elected is very good. The old one ones were not re-elected because citizens didn’t 
want them. We elect them every five years. In a very persuasive manner. 
 
Q: What is your attitude towards the US? What is this attitude based on? How long have 
you had this view? 
A: My attitude about the US is twofold. My attitude towards the people [Americans] is great. I 
love them and respect them.  They are good and have contributed many things. Medical, 
technological [inventions], for the future. I have always had this opinion about them.  They don’t 
know the reality because the media in the U.S. is controlled by people who do not deliver the 
truth.  The U.S. government only cares about themselves.  They lobby for power [in the US]. 
They lobby for oil.  The Jewish lobby. They are all about their interests. They [U.S. elected 
officials] need money for their campaigns and they are pressured by lobbyists. Clinton almost 
ousted because Jews didn’t want pressure [from U.S. government] on Israel. ‘Why would she 
[Monica Lewinsky] hold on to the dress [material evidence for extra-marital affair] for three to 
four years?  She is Jewish.”  My attitude was not always so negative towards U.S. policies. They 
were better with Clinton.  Jimmy Carter, I loved him.  The Koran says that he, who kills one, is 
killing all humans and those who protect one, are protecting all people. Even if it is a Christian or 
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Jew, no killing anyone. Islam says we believe in both of them. We [Muslims] have no problem 
with Jews. Only problem is with controlling land and people, like Sharon [in Palestine]. They are 
religious like us. Sadat [former Egyptian president] said this in the Knesset [Israeli Parliament]. 
 
Q: President Bush has proclaimed the ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ to democratize the 
Middle East from Morocco to Pakistan.  Why do you think this policy has been put forth? 
Will democratization succeed? Why or why not? 
A: Arab countries will not accept external pressures, they will refuse. Princes from Arab 
countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman will not allow elections to overcome the 
government. They want to make all the laws.  They want to be royal, the whole family. Which 
prince will allow their control to be taken from them? We have groups internally, tribes and they 
do not get [understand] American ideas! They cannot accept only one law! Every country has its 
own thinking. Egypt is closer to American thinking because it has a republic with a President. 
Republics can agree, not like royal family. The citizens say no to the U.S., not the government.  
 
Q: The Bush Administration is seeking to begin democratization in the Middle East with 
the removal of Saddam Hussein. Why do you think this policy has been put forth? Will the 
war in Iraq mean more or less democracy in the Middle East? Why or Why not? 
A: Where is the democracy? Eaid Al Laway who worked in the FBI, CIA in America, was picked 
by the US and says the same things as Saddam when he came to power, ‘We will destroy anyone 
in our way!’  He [Bush] went to Iraq for oil. All over U.S., Europe, and Arab world people are 
saying ‘No blood for oil’.  Also, he [Bush] wants to monitor the whole world and Iraq is in the 
middle of the world and they [U.S. government] can monitor Russia, Arabs, and even Iran. 
 
Q: Will the US-Iraq war mean more or less terrorism in the Middle East? 
A: More terrorism, its obvious, isn’t it? But in Iraq, that is not terrorism.  They are freedom 
fighters. Just like during the U.S. revolution against Great Britain.  That was not terrorism, they 
were fighting for there freedom.  Everything against the US is labeled terrorism. When the US 
went to Iraq and Afghanistan and killed all of those people, wasn’t that terrorism? That is worse 
because it’s international terrorism. Where’s terrorism? Who defines a terrorist?  Palestine is the 
number one reason for terrorism. 
 
Q: The U.S. has been asking Egypt to ‘show the way’ for other Arab countries and lead 
democratic reform. Do you welcome America’s call for democratic ideals in Egypt? Why or 
why not? 
A: The Egyptian Parliament, Maglis Al Shaab, chooses one person as a candidate and the people 
vote.  The people vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’.  He [candidate] must have 50% to be elected.  Parliament is 
also elected.  They are representative. 
 
Q: How many people vote?   
A: 70% of those registered, about 40 million voted for Parliament seats.  There are a lot of 
representatives from many political parties.  The Muslim Brothers won 19 districts under a 
different name.  They now form a group, a strong voice.   
 
Q: Do you welcome America’s call for democratic ideals in Egypt?   
A: This is in our interest, my interest.  Like the Marshall Plan after WWII.  It is necessary for 
Egypt to be a leader for others.  But there are limits.  Any changes must include religion.  We are 
Muslim and religious.  It is the most important thing.  We can fight years for religion.  Islam can 
change over time.  There are many Christian countries with wars, AIDS, and many problems. 
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Why target Islam?  Islam does not mean terrorism.  It says violence can be used only in self-
defense, in the homeland.  Respondent’s demeanor remains the same throughout the entire 
interview – very optimistic and persuasive. 
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APPENDIX D:  Interview Three Data 
 
 
Date of Interview: July 5, 2004 
Place of Interview: Alexandria, Egypt 
 
Demographic information:  
Career:  Accountant. 
Political Party: None. 
Religion: Coptic Orthodox Christian. 
Degree:  Bachelors of Accounting from Alexandria University. 
Residence: Alexandria, Egypt 
Current Occupation: Manager of a car business. 
Age:  45  
Visited the U.S.: No 
Name: “Magued” 
 
Q: How to you define “democracy”? 
A: To be able to say what you want.  Freedom. When Nasser was in power, we were scared just 
like Saddam’s Iraq.  We were scared to talk politics in our home. Our mom would tell us to shut 
up in our own homes because they [Egyptian government] might hear us. 
 
Q: Are you a part of an Egyptian political party? Why or Why not? 
A: No, I don’t have any political ambitions. I come from a culture that has made me not care 
about politics.  It makes no difference to me.  I know that we can’t change anything. 
 
Q: What is your attitude towards the US? What is this attitude based on?  
A:  I don’t like the US at all. I’ve never been there. It’s because of their policies, of course, and 
their values, their concepts. The government is always the same, no matter who is elected. They 
are always with Israel.  Each president may be a degree up or down, but generally they are all the 
same. Their concepts [the US], the way they think, that they should take something over in order 
to get something.  Do whatever it takes to get what they want.  Can you be sure who is 
responsible for 9-11? The Jews were not killed in the Twin towers. They left the day before and 
took that day off work.  How did they take so many pictures of all the angles of the building? 
They were ready to take the pictures. Maybe the Arabs, maybe Bin Laden, but who makes them 
do it? The CIA, the U.S., the Jews. Speaking in a matter-of-fact way. 
 
Q: President Bush has proclaimed the ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ to democratize the 
Middle East from Morocco to Palestine.  Why do you think this policy has been put forth? 
Will democratization succeed? Why or why not? 
A:  He [Bush] doesn’t want democracy. He wants to put on a show that he is good.  He is trying 
to give justification for what he is doing. A plan to start with Iraq and extend throughout the 
Middle East [sarcastically] and he wants to include Pakistan to prevent it from being only Arabs. 
He is threatened by that. Has corrupted Iraq. They [U.S. soldiers] protected the oil and left the 
museums to be robbed. An initiative? He can’t. You can see the result in Iraq. Soon he’ll invade 
Syria. They [U.S.] inspect nuclear weapons in Iraq and Libya but its no problem for Israel to have 
them. Why don’t they care about if Israel has them? Why is it okay for them to have them? 
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Q: The Bush Administration is seeking to begin democratization in the Middle East with 
the removal of Saddam Hussein. Why do you think this policy has been put forth? Will the 
war in Iraq mean more or less democracy in the Middle East? Why or Why not? 
A: First they [the US government] said the reason for invasion was for nukes and weapons.  Then 
it was because of a link between Saddam and Al-Qaeda. He [Saddam] is a terrorist. These reasons 
are just not true.  They were a justification for his [Bush] plan.  There are no weapons or a 
relationship between Saddam and Al-Qaeda.  Who made him [Saddam] anyway? The U.S. did. 
They gave him weapons and technology against Iran during the Iraq-Iran war. They [the US] 
invaded Iraq for oil and to help reconstruction companies. Dick Cheney [U.S. Vice President] 
helped Halliburton, his old company.  Bush talks about democracy to justify what he is doing.  Is 
it being done for our good? No. 
 
Q: Will the US-Iraq war mean more or less terrorism in the Middle East? 
A: More terrorism. Why? Because some people have beliefs. Americans and Jews are full of 
corruption. Palestinian women are shown crying on television because their house is destroyed. 
Why would they [terrorists] strap a bomb and blow themselves up? What would make them do 
that? He can’t go to work; he’s watched his mom, aunt, uncle die- his house devastated. They get 
stopped to go to work. All that puts pressure on people. There’s no justice. Different treatment 
creates hate. One Israeli gets killed and its shown all over the place [in the media]. One-hundred 
Palestinians get killed and no one shows anything. Aren’t they civilians? They [Israeli 
government] do not allow reporters in Palestinian villages after they massacre them.  The Arabs 
have learned that the only way American listens, is by force, by killing Americans.  The U.S. tries 
to distract the world about Bin Laden and terrorism. So that the world will not realize what they 
are doing in Iraq. But the world will know in time. Maybe not right away but they will know. The 
Bush Administration used 9-11 so that they could have a reason to go to Afghanistan and Iraq. 9-
11 gave him [Pres. Bush] a reason to go to the Middle East. 
 
Q: The US has been asking Egypt to ‘show the way’ for other Arab countries and lead 
democratic reform. Do you welcome America’s call for democratic ideals in Egypt? Why or 
why not? 
A: We don’t need his [Bush] help. People here [in Egypt] can say what they want.  One day a 
person is cursing the President. The other is cursing the government. I’ll show you the 
newspapers today.  We don’t need someone from outside to help us change here.  We are not like 
the days of Nasser anymore.  We were scared to death to talk politics in our home.  If you dared 
say something during that time, you may not come home that night.  We would say [the 
expression], “they took him behind the sun.”  We would ask as kids, ‘who would here?’  No one 
knew.  There was just fear.  We were scared. It’s not like that now.  We can say what we want. 
We have political parties. 
 
After the interview, he expressed great concern about the possibility of a re-election of George W. 
Bush, asking repeatedly about the probability of his being re-elected.  This respondent seemed 
genuinely worried about the prospect.  He also mentioned that he is waiting for a visa to the U.S. 
and hopes to immigrate soon. 
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APPENDIX E:  Interview Four Data 
 
“Ibrahim” 
Date of Interview:: August 3, 2004 
Place of Interview: Alexandria, Egypt 
Demographic information: 
Career: Owns an accounting firm. 
Political party:  None. 
Religion:  Muslim. 
Degree:  Bachelors of Accounting from Alexandria University. 
Residence:  Alexandria, Egypt 
Current Occupation:  Custom Clearance and Transportation officer. 
Age:  50 
Visited the U.S.:  No 
 
Q: How to you define “democracy”? 
A:  Freedom.  To say my opinion without any control over it. Everyone is free to say their 
opinions.  U.S. is supposed to be democratic but its not.  It’s like apartheid because the Jews rule 
all. Democracy is when one feels that he’s being treated like a human being.  Elections are a 
must.  Citizens should have an opinion to pick their leader.  Here [Egypt] we don’t have that. 
 
Q: Are you a part of an Egyptian political party? Why or Why not? 
A: No, don’t like them. Nothing will change if I join them.  They don’t make a difference.  They 
[Egyptian government] will do what they want and nothing will change that. 
 
Q: What is your attitude towards the US? What is this attitude based on? How long have you had 
this view? 
A: America is a country where I have never been. From what I have heard, it is a good country. 
Israel tells the U.S. government what to do. In the U.S. the Jews are many and politicians are 
worried about elections and getting reelected.  Hosni Mubarak has talked to Bush in meetings 
where Bush said that he would give Palestinians rights as a country, remove settlements and stop 
the wall they [Israeli government] is building. Two hours later, after Mubarak left, Bush met 
Sharon.  He said the exact opposite and actually gave him the green light to do anything else they 
wanted with a guarantee that no one will stand in their way.  Why? Because he [Bush] wants to 
be reelected. I don’t like the US government and their policies. When Bush came, I began to hate 
the policies. Clinton was better.  Bush Sr. got paid one milliare from Kuwait for the 1991 Gulf 
war. But, I like the country and have wanted to go there for a long time. He speaks in an 
overconfident manner; like he is privy to this information and is teaching the interviewer.  
 
Q: President Bush has proclaimed the ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ to democratize the Middle 
East from Morocco to Pakistan.  Why do you think this policy has been put forth? Will 
democratization succeed? Why or why not? 
A: He [Bush] says that but its only words. If he doesn’t have it in his own country, how can he 
have it anywhere else? He put forth this policy because he thinks they [citizens of the Middle 
East] are stupid.  He tells them that they need it and pretends that he is helping them.  But really 
he’s trying to fool them, tricking them.  He actually wants to control the Middle East. He won’t 
be able to do that without talking about other goals. 
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Q: The Bush Administration is seeking to begin democratization in the Middle East with the 
removal of Saddam Hussein. Why do you think this policy has been put forth? Will the war in 
Iraq mean more or less democracy in the Middle East? Why or Why not? Will the US-Iraq war 
mean more or less terrorism in the Middle East? 
A:  Less democracy.  He [Bush] ruined the whole country. He say he wants democracy but he’s 
occupying it. He hasn’t brought democracy!  Terrorism is greater because of the occupation. 
Why? People can’t get their rights in their own government so they kill themselves.  It’s not right 
but it’s because there’s no democracy. If there was democracy and the Iraqi people could say 
their opinions there wouldn’t be any terrorism. You can’t fight terrorism because they have no 
country and no base.  He [Bush] said there were weapons of mass destruction but there is none. 
He went to Iraq for oil and to put more military bases in the Middle East in order to control it. 
 
Q: The US has been asking Egypt to ‘show the way’ for other Arab countries and lead 
democratic reform. Do you welcome America’s call for democratic ideals in Egypt? Why or why 
not? 
A:  It [Egypt] is the biggest Arab country with the largest population.  America always talks to 
Mubarak so that he will influence other Arabs.  Ever since the October 6th war when Egypt won, 
whenever America wants something from other Arab countries they ask Egypt to listen. They 
give Egypt money and then they have control over our country, our education and even our 
curriculum. Put this here, put that there.  I do not welcome the democratic influence from the U.S.  
They do not have democracy in the U.S. They [U.S. government] should worry about democracy 
in their own country before they worry about democracy in other countries. I heard that you can’t 
even say what you want there anymore. The FBI will show up at your house.  They are not 
democratic.  I would welcome democracy but the US doesn’t bring democracy. 
 
After the interview, the respondent keeps referring to his worries about getting his visa to the U.S. 
because of the interview. He is concerned that I will be able to say something to prevent him from 
getting a visa. I keep reassuring him that I am not a part of the US government and that we have 
freedom of speech in America. He does not seem to be convinced that the U.S. is democratic. 
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APPENIDIX F: Interview Five Data 
 
“Mariam” 
Date of Interview:  August 10, 2004 
Place of Interview:  Alexandria, Egypt 
Demographic information: 
Career:  Journalist and business owner. 
Political Party:  The Wafd Party. 
Religion:  Coptic Orthodox Christian.  
Degree:  Bachelors in Business from Alexandria University. 
Residence:  Alexandria, Egypt 
Current Occupation:  Attorney. 
Age:  47  
Visited the U.S.  Yes 
 
Q: How to you define “democracy”? 
A: That if I write, they don’t break my pencil. I can say what I want.  They say that you can write 
what you want, but you really can’t.  What about Rida Halal? He used to write in newspapers, a 
journalist in Al-Ahram newspaper.  Beautiful works.  Where did he go? He disappeared. I cried 
so hard when he disappeared. He spoke of what the people want.  
 
Q: Are you a part of an Egyptian political party? Why or Why not? 
A: Yes, I am a member of the Wafd Party and so was my father. During the Sadat era, I was also 
one of six people to invest in a group that fosters religious dialogue between Christians and 
Muslims.  This was also to help prevent Muslim discrimination against Christians. Discrimination 
is terrible in Egypt. If a little Muslim boy sees me wearing a cross around my neck, he’ll make a 
face or gesture at me.  Muslims also burn churches and beat up priests. 
 
Q: What is your attitude towards the US? What is this attitude based on? How long have you had 
this view? 
A: I love America. I have traveled everywhere. Why? Not because they are powerful, but because 
they have respect for many things. They respect people, animals and everything has a value. Also, 
the U.S. has contributed greatly to the world’s technology. They [Americans] have invented many 
valuable things for the world today. For as long as I have lived I have had that view. 
 
Q: President Bush has proclaimed the ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ to democratize the Middle 
East from Morocco to Pakistan.  Why do you think this policy has been put forth? Will 
democratization succeed? Why or why not? 
A: “Bush pretends to care for them [Arabs] so that he can control them and bring them closer. 
People say it’s a war on Islam. If it is then I agree!” I have read the Koran three times. The first 
time I skimmed through it, the second time I read it and the third time I really knew it. “This is a 
religion? What a religion! God forgive them. They write about bad things, dirty ideas. Egypt and 
the Middle East will always go backwards as long as Islam is dominant.  Democracy cannot 
succeed when Islam is dominant. The whole Middle East is electrified and tense. Speaking 
dramatically and seriously with disgust. 
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Q: The Bush Administration is seeking to begin democratization in the Middle East with the 
removal of Saddam Hussein. Why do you think this policy has been put forth? Will the war in 
Iraq mean more or less democracy in the Middle East? Why or Why not? 
A: I don’t believe that the US went for oil and to control the world, like many people say.  If the 
people in Iraq believed that the US was there for democracy, then it would happen. But they 
don’t. There won’t be democracy in Iraq. There will be more conflict and war.  The Shites want 
power and will continue to struggle with many groups for power.  They will keep killing each 
other, just like in Lebanon, until they are fed up with all the killings. Each group wants control. 
 
Q: Will the US-Iraq war mean more or less terrorism in the Middle East? 
A: I respect Bush because he’s done nothing wrong. So the military is there. What has he done 
wrong?  He can’t leave. They are killing and beheading people right now, even with him there. 
 
Q: The US has been asking Egypt to ‘show the way’ for other Arab countries and lead 
democratic reform. Do you welcome America’s call for democratic ideals in Egypt? Why or why 
not? 
A: They [US government] actually commanded them to do it. I welcome them greatly. I wish US 
would come back into Egypt like they were in the past. Egypt will go forward instead of 
backward. Egypt today is actually going backwards.  This is because of the strong Muslim 
fundamentalism that is taking over the country.  Omar Quadaffi [President of Libya] says he 
wants to learn from the US and that’s why he’s been cooperative lately. He actually sent the 
highest people to America to learn progressive ideas and gives them millions of dollars to 
reconstruct Libya. Egypt needs to also learn from the U.S. instead of trying to resist it. 
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APPENDIX G:  Interview Six Data 
 
“Mohammed” 
Date of Interview:  June 22, 2004 
Place of Interview:  Alexandria, Egypt 
Demographic information: 
Career:  Civil Engineer. 
Political Party:  None. 
Religion:  Muslim. 
Degree:  Bachelors of Engineering from Alexandria University. 
Residence:  Alexandria, Egypt 
Current Occupation:  Owns Construction and Engineering business. 
Age:  55  
Visited the U.S.:  No 
 
Q: How to you define “democracy”? 
A: When the decisions of the masses rule. When a state allows for collective decision-making. 
People must be able to have the ability to choose. Also, the freedom to express frustration, 
discontent or disapproval with the ruling government. 
 
Q: Are you a part of an Egyptian political party? Why or Why not? 
A: No, they are all vain.  If you have a lot of money you can buy your way into the parliamentary 
seats. I don’t vote for the seats because they make it too difficult to vote. You have to stand in 
line for hours in the heat. The personal cost is too high. And then the outcome may not even be 
counted right. So it’s generally a waste time. 
 
Q: What is your attitude towards the US? What is this attitude based on? How long have you had 
this view? 
A: The policies of the U.S. are hypocritical. They say one thing and do another. They have no 
shame in changing their minds to suit their interests, even in front of the entire world. They are 
allies with dictators and then they topple their regime. America used to be a leader but now it is 
an international terrorist. The people of America do not know except what the government and 
special interests want them to know. The American people cannot be blamed for the injustices 
their government causes. I have never been there and don’t really have a desire to go. 
 
Q: President Bush has proclaimed the ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ to democratize the Middle 
East from Morocco to Pakistan.  Why do you think this policy has been put forth? Will 
democratization succeed? Why or why not? 
A:  They use the ‘war on terror’ as a reason for democracy in the Middle East.  But they [U.S. 
government] were the ones responsible for September 11th with the Jews. Look at history. The 
Jews have often killed for a political goal. The Messianic Jews have done it many times. Look at 
when they had King Ferdinand killed before World War II. And that’s when Hitler punished 
them. They are willing to even destroy something they own to generate a reaction against their 
enemies to achieve a certain goal. September 11th allowed the U.S. to react against the Arabs for 
their own benefit. They have control of Iraqi oil and more military bases throughout the Middle 
East. No, it [democratization] won’t be possible. Not as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict 
continues. The U.S. has no credibility.  
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Q: The Bush Administration is seeking to begin democratization in the Middle East with the 
removal of Saddam Hussein. Why do you think this policy has been put forth?  
A: Bush said first that he reason he is invading Iraq is for weapons of mass destruction. Now that 
they can’t find any, he claims it is for democracy.  It doesn’t look good for the U.S. when they 
change their reasons for going to war. The entire international community knows that the reasons 
initially given by the Bush administration are false and that there are other reasons. Other than oil, 
of course, the war in Iraq is a war on Islam. It is like the Crusades. Now that the Soviet enemy is 
gone, the U.S. has made Islam the enemy. 
 
Q: Will the US-Iraq war mean more or less terrorism in the Middle East? 
A: Terrorism will definitely increase. Saddam Hussein kept the Sunni, Shite, and Kurds under 
control. The country needs someone to prevent conflict between these groups. The Shites are 
known for being extremely aggressive and violent people. And they are aligning with terrorists 
from other countries now. Terrorism for the entire Middle East will increase because Iraq is and 
will be so chaotic, it will provide a place for terrorists to operate. 
 
Q: Will the war in Iraq mean more or less democracy in the Middle East? Why or Why not?  
A: If the U.S. leaves Iraq there will not be democracy. There will be a great deal of conflict 
between groups. The U.S. does not have the capability to democratize the entire Middle East.  
The war in Iraq is a mess and will cause more violence and terrorism because no one can control 
all of those groups. The belief in God here is very strong and cannot be ignored. The Islamic 
parties are the most organized of all the parties. They would definitely win elections in the 
Middle East if they were allowed to participate. Then they would be against the U.S. The U.S 
would never want that, so they can’t really be serious about democracy. 
 
Q: The US has been asking Egypt to ‘show the way’ for other Arab countries and lead 
democratic reform. Do you welcome America’s call for democratic ideals in Egypt? Why or why 
not? 
A: No, I don’t welcome America’s push for democracy in Egypt. If we want democracy, it will 
come from within the country not from outside. Here [Egypt] the military gets everything. All the 
big homes and money. We used to believe that America was about democratic ideals and that was 
something to emulate. Now we know that that’s not true. Its [U.S. government] all about 
supporting the Israelis. There is no good democratic model to follow. There are some who say 
that Islam is the way to rule the country. But still there is no good Islamic model to follow. Iran is 
a mess. Saudi Arabia is not even close. Turkey is not an Islamic country. It’s totally secular.  
America is definitely not the model that we will follow. We don’t trust them or what they say. 
During the entire interview his mannerisms were very serious with a stern look on his face. 
 
Expressed concerns after the interview about the possibility of Bush being reelected. He asked 
about the chance of that occurring and seemed extremely worried about the outcome. 
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APPENDIX H:  Interview Seven Data 
“Saad” 
Date of Interview:  June 27, 2004  
Place of Interview:  Alexandria, Egypt 
Demographic information: 
Career:  Physician of Gynecology. 
Political Party:  None 
Religion:  Muslim 
Degree:   Medical degree from the University of Alexandria. 
Residence:  Alexandria, Egypt 
Current Occupation:  Owner of a private Outpatient Center/Specialist Hospital. 
Age:  54  
Visited the U.S.  Yes 
 
Q: How to you define “democracy”? 
A: The ability for citizens to choose their leader. When people have the opportunities for a good 
quality of life. Jobs that will allow people to improve their lives. 
 
Q: Are you a part of an Egyptian political party? Why or Why not? 
A: No. They are all corrupt and ineffective. Their votes don’t even count. “I don’t even get 
involved in voting for seats in the Parliament because I know my vote won’t count. The ballot 
boxes are already full before people vote. The decision is already made before the election takes 
place. The voting process itself is corrupt.” Before 1952, people in Egypt were very politically 
active and involved. Something happened in the Nasser era and people stopped being politically 
active. It was probably the American influence on Egypt. The Wafd party is still around and has 
newspapers with free speech. Mubarak allows freedom of speech in print. He monitors the 
Muslim Brothers and all religious groups. 
 
Q: What is your attitude towards the US? What is this attitude based on? How long have you had 
this view? 
A: America’s influence on Egypt has been negative. They give us aid but it helps our government 
and military control the country. Their policies are self-interested and do not help anyone. I used 
to like America when I thought it represented good values.  Now when I think of America, I think 
of selfishness, greed and control that are obvious through their policies. I am referring to their 
policies. I like to visit America and go there often to vacation. The country itself has a lot to offer. 
But the government is immoral. 
 
Q: President Bush has proclaimed the ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ to democratize the Middle 
East from Morocco to Pakistan.  Why do you think this policy has been put forth? Will 
democratization succeed? Why or why not? 
A: The democracy excuse it used to meddle in Arab countries’ affairs after September 11th. First 
you must ask who is responsible for 9-11? Do you really think the Arabs did it? No. They do not 
have the expertise and the brains to conduct such a sophisticated operation. The Arabs strap 
bombs and blow themselves up. They do not have the technology to fly planes and navigate it this 
way. 
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Q: Who does?  
A: Probably the CIA or FBI with the Jews from Israel, of course. The US wants to be able to have 
an excuse to change its foreign policy from supporting the Arab regimes like Saudi Arabia.  The 
Madrid bombing, yes, that was the Arabs who were responsible. But 9-11, no.  It will not 
succeed. Bush will not be able to. Let’s say, for a moment, that I agree for the U.S. to get rid of 
Saddam Hussein. Now, if they [U.S.] invade Syria next, for example, the Arab communities [in 
Syria] will welcome them to get rid of the Assad government and once they do, they will turn on 
the Americans and fight them. The U.S. has taught the Arabs that the only way to get their 
attention is to use violence. The Arabs think that the only way to get the US to listen to them is to 
kill them. Bush does not negotiate or discuss. Just like in Beirut and Saudi Arabia and today in 
Iraq. When Americans are killed, they are forced to action.  
 
Q: The Bush Administration is seeking to begin democratization in the Middle East with the 
removal of Saddam Hussein. Why do you think this policy has been put forth?  
A: The reason was purely economic, for oil. They [U.S. government] say that they want to get rid 
of Saddam Hussein but they used to be friends with him. He used to be their playboy. It will not 
mean democracy in Iraq. There are no signs of democracy. Saddam Hussein used to kill the 
Shites, now the U.S. kills the Shites. So nothing has changed. The Shites are so violent that the 
only way to control them is through violence and killing.  
 
Q: Will the US-Iraq war mean more or less terrorism in the Middle East? Why or Why not? 
A: Terrorism is and will continue to increase. It stems from poverty and hopelessness. People 
look to religion for a safe haven. When there is prosperity, terrorism will not be used as a viable 
method. The U.S. is not encouraging prosperity, its actually making the situation worse. 
 
Q: The US has been asking Egypt to ‘show the way’ for other Arab countries and lead 
democratic reform. Do you welcome America’s call for democratic ideals in Egypt? Why or why 
not? 
A: We are not ready for democracy. And no, I don’t welcome America’s call for democracy. 
America does not even have a true democracy. Neither does Great Britain. They manipulate the 
people to think a certain way.  Sixty percent of the population in Egypt is still illiterate and 
worried about surviving. They are too poor to think about the political process.  Even if you sit 
with the youth in Egypt today, they have no interest in politics because they can’t say anything. 
And even if we were to have elections today, the Islamic party would rule. In Alexandria, they 
one all local elections in the past before they were outlawed. That’s what we are afraid of.  The 
two main problems in Egypt are education and economic level. When those improve maybe we 
can think about democracy. This is not Egypt. You must walk through the city streets to see the 
real Egypt. Also if you look at history, Egyptians are always looking for one person to lead them, 
since the time of the Pharaohs. Mannerisms during the interview consisted of speaking calmly in 
an articulate and intellectual way. 
 
After the interview, asked about the possibility of George Bush being reelected. He expressed 
hope that he would not be reelected. 
 
